Hungarian Spectrum

"To the left!": A debate on social democracy in Hungary

The debate occurred between two former colleagues who worked for Magyar Hírlap before that paper became the mouthpiece of the far right. But their careers took very different turns. Gyula Hegyi became a socialist politician while László Bartus left for the United States where he is currently the editor-in-chief of a Hungarian-language weekly, Amerikai-Magyar Népszava Szabadság, which first appeared in 1891. From its name it is evident that the paper from its launch was closely associated with the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. So one would think that the two men would think alike. Wrong! Hegyi belongs to the left wing of MSZP which accepts capitalism with reluctance and would like to "tame it," while Bartus is certain that as long as capitalism is healthy the ordinary folks will thrive.

Both Gyula Hegyi and László Bartus are prolific writers. Hegyi wrote hundreds of articles on culture and politics in Hungarian dailies and weeklies as well as nine books: three collections of poems and six nonfiction books, mostly about the left. One of his books, published in 1995, is entitled Left-Side Story. Yes, with this English title. I also found an article of his in The Guardian (December 22, 2006) with the title and lead sentence "Learn from our failures and create a socialist democracy: Eastern Europe remains condemned by its past to neo-liberalism, but Latin America can break free if it pays heed to the lessons" (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/dec/22/comment.venezuela). I guess this pretty well sums up Hegyi's political philosophy. Bartus is also prolific. He wrote several books from the vantage point of an investigator reporter, the best known of which is one on the early extreme right (Jobb magyarok: A szélsőjobb útja a hatalomhoz [2000]). In addition he writes a column every week in Amerikai-Magyar Népszava (http://nepszava.com/).

The debate started with an article by Gyula Hegyi in Népszava (June 25, 2009) entitled "Balra át!" (To the Left!). Perhaps before I summarize Hegyi's ideas on the course MSZP should take I ought to note that in the last five years Hegyi has been a member of the European Parliament. On this year's MSZP list he was number five and only four MSZP candidates made it. So it's no wonder that he is unhappy.

Hegyi starts by conceding future defeat for the party (which, as I've said earlier, no politician should ever do). He announces that MSZP has no chance at the next elections. According to him in the past the hope of victory was always there, even in 1998 when Fidesz could only win by making a deal with the Smallholders after the first round of voting when MSZP was leading. But now "practically no one believes that MSZP can possibly win" in 2010. The "staggering defeat" suffered should wake up the leadership of MSZP: there must be a change. It must be a fundamental change, not just "a change of slogans." According to him MSZP supporters became disillusioned because they perceived the party as "representing the interests of big business." Up to a point, Hegyi continues, this accusation is unfair because the party "tried to soften the antisocialist measures of the government and tried to lessen the outrageous privileges of the plutocracy." It's okay if the capitalists support MSZP from the background, but "they mustn't have a role in the management of the party." Hegyi here is obviously referring to Ferenc Gyurcsány, a former businessman. The socialist, leftist former majority of the population turned away from their favorite party because a capitalist was leading it. Gyurcsány, the capitalist, is gone but what about Gordon Bajnai, the other capitalist? I assume that in Hegyi's mind the problem hasn't been solved with Gyurcsány's departure. After all, MSZP is supporting a government that is headed by another wealthy former businessman.

For Hegyi a turn "To the left!" can be credible only if the party "unequivocally breaks with the representatives of capitalist interests." The party should abandon its "earlier practice of deals and instead should choose a leadership completely free of any financial past." For a politics of the left one needs politicians of the left. His final sentence reads: "The people are waiting for a pure left that captures the original meaning of the words and that represents the socialist communal ethos within the inevitable embrace of capitalism."

László Bartus, reading this, became irate and wrote a sharp reply in the July 6 issue of the same paper. The title is "Balra át? Hova?" (To the left? Where?) If Hegyi thinks that "the problems of Hungary are caused by capitalism" he is wrong. The problem is exactly the opposite: it is the lack of true capitalism. MSZP--in Bartus's opinion--"softened" capitalism to such an extent that it managed to prevent its full development. Perhaps unfairly Bartus interprets Hegyi's reference to those who consistently represented the socialist ideals as people "whose thinking hasn't changed since 1972." He blames Hegyi and his leftist comrades for the financial troubles of the country. After all, they were the ones who spent nonexistent revenues on a pseudo-welfare state. For Bartus "a leftist turn" would be the final nail in Hungary's coffin. It is clear that for Bartus "a leftist turn" means overspending followed by belt tightening. Gyurcsány said something similar in his blog: the problem is not that they were not leftist enough but sometimes they were too much so. But Bartus goes farther because he seems to believe in trickle-down or supply-side economics. He closes with a few words about Hegyi's invidious comment about those businessmen who shouldn't be anywhere close to the party. His retort: "We can hardly wait for the time when we can read again after the MSZP candidates' names like in the olden days: János Kádár, worker." 

Although Gyula Hegyi wrote that he really shouldn't answer Bartus's piece because "there is a certain level beneath which it's not worth entering into discussion," he does so anyway (Népszava, July 9). He criticizes some of Bartus's overly optimistic descriptions of unregulated capitalism but more importantly he does what he neglected to do in his first piece. He elaborates on what he means by "leftist politics." He "unequivocally states that a turn to the left doesn't mean irresponsible squandering [osztogatás] or an increase in the deficit. It means cutting back the privileges of the capitalists, taxation of luxury cars and eighteen-wheelers rumbling across the country, reduction of bureaucracy in the schools and hospitals, making the life of entrepreneurs easier." Although these measures would mean additional revenues for the government, "the essence [of the left turn] is not a whittling away at the budget but control of financial and economic processes, increasing society's feeling of security, and assisting communal initiatives." MSZP should embrace the goal of full employment that is already included in the Lisbon strategy of the European Union. He admits that at the moment this would be no more than a gesture, but as a longer term goal it should be included in the party platform. In addition, it is not enough to emphasize human rights, greater stress should be placed on the rights of employees and consumers. In addition, "consumers who are at the mercy of unscrupulous 'service' providers of energy should be shielded with the introduction of tough measures." And if that is not enough, "the socialists could clear up a lot of misunderstandings if they would suggest a change in the constitution to declare that the responsibility for health care, education, and energy supply lies with the state." According to Hegyi that doesn't necessarily mean that these sectors should be state-owned but that they should be strictly regulated. He also suggests that "the more important privatizations that took place after 1990 should be reexamined to see whether the new owners honored their obligations as stated in the original contract." If not, the state should severely punish them not only by demanding fines for noncompliance but they should be held legally responsible for breach of contract.

As the world struggles to find a solution to the recently compressed and increasingly devastating boom and bust cycles, this debate may be a humble beginning. On the other hand it may be sadly naive. For those who haven't read one of the most talked about conspiracy theory articles of late, it's an indictment of Goldman Sachs, the "great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity." The piece appeared in Rolling Stone magazine, of all places, and it's a compelling tale. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/28816321/the_great_american_bubble_machine

A Hungarian political microcosm: Fót

Fót is a picturesque town seventeen kilometers north of Budapest. One section of the town is described as the favorite place of the nouveau riche. It is prospering. While the population of Budapest is decreasing Fót's is growing. Just in the last four or five years the town added almost 1,000 inhabitants. Considering that it is a town of 18,000, that is no mean feat in a country whose overall population is shrinking. The old part of town is not that old, but it was fortunate to be the site of Count István Károlyi's estate. Károlyi was not only rich but had good taste. He employed the best architects of the day for his own palace as well as for the town's Catholic Church. The palace looks like this now. In a part of it lives László Károlyi, a descendant of the former owner who returned to Hungary in the 1990s. The rest serves as a home for orphaned or abandoned children.

Taking a quick look at the local elections in the last few years it seems that Fót's citizens vote mostly for people representing right-wing parties but that there is a fairly strong socialist minority as well. The 2002 elections were interesting because out of seventeen members of the city council there were only three from Fidesz, three from the Christian Democrats, and three from MIÉP. The mayor was "independent" on paper. His name was Géza Szent-Iványi. He ran again in 2006, this time as the representative of Fidesz. By 2006, as a result of the virtual disappearance of the Christian Democrats and MIÉP, Fidesz became the leading force in town. Currently seven members of the council are from Fidesz while three people represent local mini-parties that normally espouse right-wing ideas. In addition there are six MSZP members and one "independent" who this time happens to be of Gypsy origin and, if I understand correctly, usually sides with the MSZP members.

Géza Szent-Iványi's career as mayor of Fót ended in disgrace. The council discovered that their mayor took part in criminal activities and so voted for his dismissal. Szent-Iványi fought for his survival in the courts but after a year and a half, in October 2008, the verdict became final: he was found guilty of fraud and was slapped with a hefty fine, the equivalent of 400 days in jail. Fidesz  talked about kicking him out of the party but never followed through. In fact, at the end of March 2009 Népszava reported that Szent-Iványi not only remained a party member but was still serving in the Pest county general assembly.

It seems that Fidesz doesn't have much luck with its candidates in Fót. In January 2009 bi-elections were held and a newcomer was the Fidesz-Christian Democrat candidate: Zsolt Mádly, a lawyer. Apparently Mádly was born and raised in Romania but emigrated to Hungary where he received citizenship. Mádly, reflecting the general trend, won by a huge margin--he received 3,254 votes as opposed to the MSZP candidate, who got only 1,650. If we compare these numbers to the results of the 2004 elections when Szent-Iványi won only by 34 votes over his MSZP opponent, Béla Fábry, one can see the dramatic change in the political mood in Hungary. However, perhaps the electorate of Fót is less than happy today with their choice because in his short stint as mayor Mádly has behaved irrationally (or, more charitably perhaps, badly) and, according to the city council, illegally. A day ago the city council voted unanimously for his suspension as mayor of Fót. In addition, Béla Fábry (MSZP deputy mayor) also paid a visit to the police station where he charged him with physical assault.

What happened? In the past (that is, before yesterday) if Mádly didn't particularly like what one of the members said at the council meeting he simply pulled out the microphone's connector. Or he got up and illegally closed the session. Or he challenged a foe on the council to a boxing match. One female member of the council was on the receiving end of all sorts of epithets. He threatened to shoot another councilman "as if he were a mad dog."

Yesterday, at the meeting convened to remove him from office, things really got out of hand. The mayor not only interrupted Béla Fábry, his bête noir, by disconnecting the microphone but he threw the connector straight into Fábry's face. When I read the headline in Népszava "Bloody fight in the mayor's office in Fót" I thought that it was just the usual journalistic exaggeration. But no. Népszabadság even managed to get hold of a video on which one can see the whole elevating scene, during which the friends of Mádly cheered him on in the background. Anyone who's interested in the fracas in Fót can see it at http://nol.hu/belfold/fot__verekedo_telepulesvezetok  A Fidesz spokesman responded by claiming that the mayor did not intend to do any harm and, as an alternative theory, that Fábry was actually faking it.

Before the outburst the council had voted unanimously to suspend Mádly as mayor of the town, and not just because of the way he conducted meetings. The final straw was the surfacing of a CD a few weeks ago. Oh, those cursed CD's. How much trouble they can cause. Just think of Ibolya Dávid's encounter with a CD. A few days ago Fábry and a Fidesz member of the council received a CD on which three men can be heard having a conversation. The topic is local road construction. One of the speakers is the head of the public utility services of the city of Fót, the other is the Fidesz member of the board overseeing the activities of this utility, and the third is a lawyer representing a well known construction company from the city of Pápa. The topic of the conversation is how to squeeze extra money out of the deal in the form of kickbacks. (I assume that there was no competitive bidding or, if there was, the favored firm would be the winner by one means or another.) Although the released excerpts are not entirely clear on the point, it seems that the extra money would flow into the coffers of Fidesz. In brief, the construction company would cost out the job and would then add a "kickback factor," so that the difference between the inflated bid and the realistic bid would be returned to the local Fidesz leaders and from there on perhaps higher. The CD also makes it clear that the person who facilitates the deal would get a bonus. There is also mention of Hír TV and Lánchíd Rádió (both Fidesz organs) as recipients of the extra money. Why? It is not clear to me. Perhaps for favorable reporting of the deal. Another interesting feature of this CD is that the name of "Laci Kövér" comes up in a most interesting context. One of the three men mentions that the scheme they propose has been tried elsewhere, and another man adds that "in the end we needed Laci Kövér but we managed." Perhaps it is not immaterial that Kövér is from Pápa.

Finding their way: The Hungarian socialists' dilemma

Ferenc Gyurcsány's answer to the problems of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was an adaptation of Tony Blair's "Third Way" so successfully employed as well by Bill Clinton and others. The "Third Way" is a term that has been used to describe a political position that attempts to transcend left-wing and right-wing politics. This approach is commonly viewed as representing a centrist compromise between capitalism and socialism, or between market liberalism and democratic socialism. But the Hungarian version of a centrist, reformist political orientation within the Hungarian Socialist Party failed. Ferenc Gyurcsány was unable to deliver, and today MSZP is in crisis. What happened and why? This is what the party leadership is now trying to figure out, but I'm not at all sure that they are on the right track. The catchword today is "return to the left." Everybody is talking about "leftist values," whatever they are.

Gyurcsány, who has not been seen or heard from since his "retirement," still has his blog except instead of writing every day as he used to he writes perhaps once a week. Mind you, his "fans" are still numerous. His last blog had over 800 comments! Usually he confines himself to everyday affairs--his knee operation, his children--but here and there he writes a few lines about politics. It is evident that he is sticking with most of his political ideas, which he still considers the foundation of a modern Hungarian society. It seems that Gyurcsány has also had enough of all this talk about "leftist values" and the accusation that where MSZP went wrong in the last seven years was the party's abandonment of leftist values. To quote Gyurcsány (June 30, 2009; http://kapcsolat.hu/blog/a_baloldalisagrol): "The question is not whether we were leftist enough in the last few years but instead whether there were times when we were too leftist." Here "being leftist" for Gyurcsány means giving too much to segments of society that are not active in producing economic growth. Children, students, the disabled, pensioners, and so on.

Those in the party who are considered to be the followers of Gyurcsány join the others in repeating the "toward the left" slogan, but they add that it also means "modernization." What modernization means in this context is also a mystery. Then there are the left-wingers. Katalin Szili and Tibor Szanyi are good examples. They want to help the lower classes and are less concerned with the middle class that is actually the backbone of the party's electorate. As Szili said this morning, she wants to work for a "plebeian mass party of the left." However, she immediately added that she doesn't want to have "a squandering state but one that develops." You will say: "but this doesn't make any sense." No, it doesn't. It doesn't because I have the feeling that Ms. Szili doesn't know what she is talking about. Both Szili and Szanyi say that they wholeheartedly support Gordon Bajnai's program because the country has no other choice. They are supporting the program of the man who just the other day made it crystal clear that "the number 3.8 is carved in stone." That is, the deficit cannot be higher than 3.8% and surely no "squandering" of public money is possible with that tight a budget. (I use the word "squandering" here because I couldn't find any better equivalent for the Hungarian "osztogató." I think this translation is fairly close.) And there's the rub. How can MSZP be the "plebeian mass party of the left," which presumably implies a very generous state, under the present circumstances?  I don't think it can be.

There are some who think that MSZP's problem is that it suffers from left-over Kádárism that prevented the full blossoming of the market economy. At the same time they continued the "insane spending" that kept the Kádár regime going for a while. As the matter of fact, practically all governments after 1990 added to the "insane spending" until the the country nearly went bankrupt. But the most recent crisis wasn't the first. In the latter part of the 1970s and the mid-1990s the country was on the brink of financial ruin as well. Both times stringent measures had to be adopted. But these measures were temporary. As soon as the country got out of financial trouble the government went back to its profligate ways. This is what they call in Hungary a policy of "loosening and tightening."

The socialists at the moment are busily apologizing for not being socialist enough. They practically admit, repeating the accusations of the opposition, that they did nothing and achieved nothing. This is, of course, not at all true. They try to explain their failure on a lack of communication. They say that they didn't "explain" the reforms properly. Some critics claim that in the middle of a financial crisis and the implementation of an austerity program the government simply shouldn't have initiated a reform program. A lot of criticism is levelled against the socialists' coalition partner, SZDSZ, because of their doctrinaire liberalism that led to the disastrous so-called health reform. Yes, health reform was handled poorly, but it wasn't a pivotal factor in the failure of the Gyurcsány government. The decline of the party began immediately after the announcement of the austerity program during the summer 2006 and has continued relentlessly ever since.

Ferenc Gyurcsány's problem was not that he was not leftist enough but that he wasn't courageous enough to make greater cuts in unnecessary social spending. To the very end he insisted on keeping the extra month of pension for 3.5 million pensioners, which was a huge budgetary burden. And when he first came out with his austerity program he said "one mustn't be afraid, it won't hurt." Well, of course, it was going to hurt. He should have been totally frank and told the whole truth. After all, it seems that Bajnai's stringent measures have been accepted and there are already tangible results that even the population has been noticing. Perhaps a less timid, less leftist approach would have been more successful than the one Gyurcsány chose. The question is whether the party leaders would have accepted such measures in the summer of 2006. They seem to accept them now but perhaps three years later, after a world economic crisis, they came to their senses. In any event, I cannot see a return to the good old socialist "plebeian mass party of the left" any time soon. The only way out is still Gyurcsány's way, without him for the time being.

János Kádár of Hungary, May 26, 1912-July 6, 1989

It was exactly twenty years ago that János Kádár died. Whatever we think of him politically he was, as János M. Rainer, director of the 56-Institute, said a few days ago, "one of the most outstanding and important personalities of the political history of the twentieth century." In his own lifetime a historical period was named for him: Kádár-korszak (the age of Kádár). He is a controversial man. Some of his former subjects remember him and his age with affection and nostalgia while others consider him a cruel murderer. Both assessments are gross simplifications of a very complex and controversial life. After 1956 he was the man responsible for the death of hundreds and the imprisonment of thousands. But that phase of his rule ended by the mid-1960s, and from there on he managed to make Hungary the "happiest barracks of the Soviet bloc." At his funeral there were as many people following his coffin as paid tribute to Imre Nagy at his burial.

Kádár was the illegitimate son of Borbála Czermanik (or Csermanek) who worked as a maid at Villa Austria in then Abbázia, today Opatija, a fancy seaside resort. She was born in today's Slovakia in the county of Komárom/Komárno and went to school for only three years. Getting from this little village to a hotel at the other end of the country shows an enterprising spirit, although it is true that at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century Hungary experienced unusually high mobility. According to some sources about 600,000 Hungarians moved from their place of origin, mostly villages, to cities, especially to Budapest. This was especially true of the area that is Slovakia today. Kádár's father was most likely János Krezinger from the county of Somogy who spent his military service in an infantry regiment stationed in Fiume (today Rijeka). Kádár didn't know who his father was until the late 1950s, but then he met Krezinger and three of his presumed half brothers.

The baby was left with foster parents in a village not very far from where the Krezinger family lived.  Kádár to his dying day spoke in a dialect used in that region. At the age of six he joined his mother in Budapest where he finished four years of elementary school and four years of middle school (polgári). He was an excellent student but further study was out of the question. At the age of fourteen he learned a trade: fixing typewriters. That was a relatively "elegant" and well-paid profession. However, he didn't feel at home among these "aristocratic" workers and a few months before he would have gotten his papers he quit.

It was at this time, in 1930, when he was eighteen years old that he became involved with the "movement." His destination wasn't the social democratic party but the illegal party of the communists (KMP) or rather its youth branch. The communist movement was very small, but the authorities paid a lot of attention to their activities. Kádár, then still called Csermanek, ended up in jail several times. By 1942 he was among the important leaders of the illegal communist movement. He was one of the homegrown communists, as opposed to the Muscovite branch of Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő, and Mihály Farkas who arrived with the Soviet troops in 1944-45. He changed his name to Kádár (meaning cooper in Hungarian). Without going into all the details, eventually all the homegrown communists became suspect and one after the other fell victim to Mátyás Rákosi's ruthless elimination of all who, in his opinion, could be his rival. (An exception to this division between Muscovites and locals was Imre Nagy, who spent about fifteen years in the Soviet Union.) In 1949 Kádár played a shameful role in the arrest and show trial of László Rajk. Two years later he himself ended up in jail and was released only in 1954. Thus in 1956 a lot of people felt that Kádár was one of the "good guys." As it turned out, however, he was cautious when it came to choosing sides.

During the revolution it looked as if Kádár were on the side of the revolution. He became the secretary of the newly formed communist party and seemed to have accepted multi-party democracy. On November 1, however, Kádár ended up in Moscow and soon enough came back with the Soviet troops. Apparently he was more or less kidnapped. Once he agreed to "consolidate" the Hungarian situation, he accepted a role that inevitably led to political suppression and the murder of many, including Imre Nagy. Kádár was "immensely ambitious and didn't shrink back even from violence because he felt that he had a mission." This mission, as he saw it, was to save the Hungarian people from "the horrors of the Horthy regime." According to historians of the period, Kádár wasn't really a reformer. He kept the regime firmly within the Soviet mold. But he managed to get as much out of the system as was humanly possible. Mind you, by the 1970s only through foreign loans. The problems that became obvious by the 1970s could perhaps have been avoided if in 1968 Kádár had allowed the country's reform economists to make the necessary changes. But he refused to admit that the Hungarian economy was floundering.

By the mid-1980s Kádár was experiencing severe mental problems. Most likely cerebral sclerosis. Near the end of his life, against his doctors' advice, he went to the April 12, 1989, meeting of the Central Committee and delivered a speech. Among his incoherent sentences the recurring theme was the murder of Imre Nagy, though he never mentioned him by name. The speech can be read in the original here: http://www.kornismihaly.hu/a_kadar_beszed.pdf  Kádár sought forgiveness: "I committed a mistake ... and what follows from that. Forgive me!" He said that his churning mind keeps returning to one thing, that he cannot stop thinking about that one thing. He claimed that the people present could have no idea what a difficult situation he was in.

Apparently at the end he foresaw that the regime he created was going to crumble and he was truly afraid for his life. He was afraid that perhaps he would suffer the same fate as his nemesis, Imre Nagy. I'm sure that if Kádár hadn't died in 1989 he would have lived his remaining years in peace. In fact, his grave is one of the most often visited in the cemetery reserved for the famous men of Hungarian history. But his remains suffered what he didn't. Kádár's grave was vandalized on May 2, 2007; a number of his bones, including his skull, were stolen, along with his wife Mária Tamáska's urn. A message reading "murderers and traitors may not rest in holy ground 1956-2006" was written nearby. The perpetrators have never been found.

I think one reason the majority of Hungarians prior to 1989 liked Kádár was that, contrary to some of the other communist leaders, he lived a simple life. He detested the personal aggrandisement so widespread in the communist world. He and his wife lived in a modest house, and they even raised chickens. He kept to himself; he had no close friends with whom he felt free to share his thoughts. Perhaps his thoughts were too painful. From his illegitimacy to his role in the revolution and his part in Imre Nagy's murder. He did play chess with György Aczél, another high level party apparatchik who was in charge of cultural matters. Apparently he didn't call anyone by his first name and didn't use the familiar form in talking to anyone. Behind his back his co-workers called him "az Öreg," the Old One. Several books were written about him. I especially enjoyed Tibor Huszár's Kádár János: Politikai életrajza, 1912-1989 2 vols. (Budapest, 2001-2003).

The Hungarian Guard demonstrates in Budapest

Undaunted by the court ruling, uniformed members of the Hungarian Guard demonstrated today in Budapest. By now the demonstrators have more or less been mopped up by the Budapest police. I tried all afternoon to piece together the various reports, but I'm still not sure how many demonstrators we are talking about. Reporters on the scene gave different numbers at different times, and it's hard to tell how large this demonstration actually was. The highest estimate I saw was eight hundred demonstrators, of whom three hundred were in the uniform of the Hungarian Guard. The rest were sympathizers. Another, presumably more precise number mentioned was the 127 people who were arrested and put into paddy wagons, including Gábor Vona, president of Jobbik.

It seems that both sides are learning. The guardists arrived in small groups at Erzsébet Square dressed only in white shirts and black pants. They carried the rest of their uniform, which they donned upon arrival. Several times the police asked the demonstrators to leave the square in the direction of the Astoria Hotel. Instead the guardists sat down on the grass hanging on to one another. The sympathizers chose a less peaceful way of protesting: they started throwing beer bottles at the policemen. A newspaperman working for Index, an online paper, was also attacked. So the guardists are learning from western models of civil disobedience but so are the police, who removed the guardists one by one.

An hour or so after the beginning of the demonstration the police started to press the crowd off the square, but it took another hour to get to the point that there were only about forty uniformed men left. The sympathizers were harder to deal with. Even at 7:00 p.m. they were ready to do battle with the police. There is a jazz club at Erzsébet Square and the demonstrators started removing tables and chairs to prepare some kind of barricade. Eventually the club simply closed. Meanwhile it was beastly hot and several people became ill. The encounter had interesting moments too: an older demonstrator jumped into the pool, clothes and all. See picture of the square. Gábor Vona was apparently removed from the scene around 7:30. Shortly after this the police moved in with full force, using nightsticks, gas spray, and tear gas.

According to one internet paper two people had heart attacks; medics were on the scene. By 8:00 p.m. the square was cleared. Only a few groups lingered and complained loudly on nearby streets. Others, numbering about 150, were pushed toward the Astoria and continued marching on Rákóczi Street toward the Eastern Station. I assume that they have dispersed since.

Lawyers working for the ombudsman's office were also on the scene and told reporters that "they will be investigating." They will ask for all documentation from the police and will form their opinion only after a study of these documents. I'm a bit puzzled about this investigation. After all, the demonstration was illegal and the Hungarian Guard is no longer a legitimate organization. What is there to investigate in this case? But this ombudsman's mind works in mysterious ways.

One thing is sure: never have the police acted so resolutely (and competently) and never have they arrested so many people. Obviously the court's verdict strengthened their resolve and gave them courage. What will happen after this? If I have to predict: the usual mess. But at least this time the law seems to be on the side of the police. For some fantastic photographs, here is a link. No wonder that there were medical emergencies. Some of the warriors are old and in terrible physical shape. There is a priceless picture of one woman waving the red and white striped flag and a fellow with a very big belly. Click on "Képgaléria"  under the first picture in the article http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20090704/vege_belvarosi_balhenak/

Law enforcement in Hungary

A local paper (Somogyi Hírlap) asked its readers which organization they trust more, the Hungarian police force or the Hungarian Guard. Eighty percent opted for the latter. Of course, this is not a representative sample but it says a lot about the radicalization of Hungarians and the lack of respect accorded the Hungarian police. I might add that this sudden concern over the lack of security and the alleged growth of criminal activities is somewhat surprising because in reality crime  hasn't increased of late. On the contrary, in the last few years it has substantially decreased in all categories. However, the public thinks otherwise. This has been especially true in the last two years.

Perhaps it started with the brutal murder of a school teacher in Olaszliszka who inadvertently hit a child who ran in front of his car. Nothing happened to the child but the extended Roma family attacked him and in front of his two daughters beat him to death. (See "Verdict in Olaszliszka [Hungary] murder," May 30, 2009) And the public's perception of a "crime wave" was further reinforced in February 2009 when a well known handball player, Marian Cozma, was stabbed to death, also by Gypsies. These two terrible incidents further inflamed the intense anti-Gypsy sentiment among the population. According to several opinion polls about 80% of Hungarians have very negative opinions of Gypsies whose situation has become close to hopeless in the last twenty years, ever since the mammoth Hungarian state factories where they worked mostly as unskilled workers closed their doors. They live in villages where work is practically nonexistent and in any case they are widely discriminated against in the job market. Large families live on state assistance and some of them help themselves to the possessions of their neighbors. These are petty crimes that the police refuse to investigate. According to the rules and regulations, if the value of the loss is less than 20,000 Ft (€73 or $100) the police simply don't bother. However, some old folks in a God-forsaken village somewhere in northeast Hungary don't consider the disappearance of a few chickens or a piglet a small thing at all. They naively think that if the mayor of the village calls in the Hungarian Guard and the Guard frightens the living daylights out of the Gypsies, then the thieves will be afraid to repeat their evil deeds. Problem solved. Well, we know it is not that simple.

There used to be all sorts of cruel police jokes in Kádár's Hungary about the inordinate stupidity of Hungarian policemen. Today the requirements for admission to the force are much higher. I wrote earlier about the woes of the Hungarian police force and gave a detailed description of the educational background necessary to become a police officer. ("The Hungarian police force," March 1, 2009) In fact, the training program for candidates is unusually long. Two solid years. I checked a few police academies in this country and found that they demand only 15-20 weeks of training. Whether Hungarians need two years to become a police officer I don't know. Most likely not.

There are also lots of complaints that there are not enough police, but as far as I know there are over 42,000 employees of the Hungarian police force, which is considered to be more than adequate. However, looking at the Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Hungarian Statistical Handbook), I ascertained that about 10,000 of these people are not policemen but civil servants who sit at their desks all day long. Another problem is that according to rules and regulations all police, even traffic cops, must serve in pairs. This is not the case in most other countries. Thus the number of cops on the beat might actually be quite low. However, there is something called "polgárőrség" (citizen guards) who are supposed to assist the police in patroling public places. I think in the United Kingdom they are called "police civilians." These people are volunteers who receive no remuneration. Their number is high: 88,000. The police chief is now considering the option of allowing a citizen guard to replace one of the two policemen patroling the streets or checking traffic violations. There are some people who would further raise the number of citizen guards and make them salaried employees. The police leadership is also thinking of enticing retired policemen to reenter the force. A Hungarian police officer can retire at a relatively early age with a handsome pension. Most of them also work in their "retirement" at well paying jobs, and therefore my feeling is that it will be difficult to convince them to return to full time work for the Hungarian police where salaries are low.

In my earlier blog I mentioned an article written by two law professors specializing in law enforcement who argued that the centralized Hungarian police system is an impediment to good police work on the local level. A policeman should be a native of the town or village where he serves. Moreover, local authorities know the law enforcement needs of the locality better than someone sitting in Budapest. So the Hungarian police force should be completely reorganized. I can't quite see the current top brass, the Országos Rendőrfőkapitányság (National Police Chief Captaincy), giving up all its powers and passing them on to local--municipal and county--authorities. However, perhaps a combination of the two systems might work. Apparently the legal foundation for establishing such a system is already in place. In the 1990 law establishing local governments there is half a sentence about "keeping order in public places" as one of the duties of local governments. That provision, according to some people, including the police chief, might enable local authorities to establish their own police force with some central financial assistance. The name would be "települési őrség," meaning simply municipal police, but Fidesz immediately labelled them "Red Guards" which is, of course, total nonsense. Especially since most of the localities are in Fidesz hands or in the hands of the so-called "independents" about whom I just wrote.

How do Hungarian policemen strike visitors? Their uniform is a bit casual but this seems to be the trend everywhere. I read somewhere that even in the United Kingdom a couple of years ago helmets were exchanged for baseball caps in certain localities. So it is not the baseball cap that is the problem. The uniform doesn't look half bad on the attached picture. On the streets, however, they look shabby. I don't know how many uniforms they get and who is in charge of their laundering but their clothes look crumpled. Moreover, the cops don't set a good example by smoking on duty and throwing cigarette  butts on the pavement. Perhaps policemen shouldn't look like the military, with perfectly pressed uniforms and shined shoes or boots. But somehow they don't look like professional crime fighters; their uniform looks more like that of an unkempt FedEx driver.

By the way, when I was looking at the web site of Kiskunlacháza the other day, I discovered that in that town of 9,000 there was no resident policeman prior to the murder of the fourteen-year-old local girl. The enterprising mayor immediately demanded and received a police force--eight policemen and a police car as well. Whether crime statistics warrant such a large force I have no idea. (As a point of comparison I live in a town of 4,500 last year voted "the best little town in Connecticut"; we have no local police, only one resident state trooper.)

And one more related topic. József Bencze, the national police chief, has an entirely different interpretation of yesterday's verdict in the Hungarian Guard case from István Lövétei who spoke yesterday on József Orosz's program. Bencze, who has a law degree, in consultation with constitutional lawyers came to the conclusion that the police have the right to disperse members of the dissolved Hungarian Guard if they appear in uniform. Tomorrow might be the first test case. Earlier a group of extremists applied for a permit to demonstrate on July 4 in front of parliament to protest the arrest of György Budaházy, the alleged mastermind behind the Arrows of Hungarians. The police refused to grant permission, claiming that such a demonstration would impede the work of the legislators. However, that didn't deter the organizers, who are still planning to demonstrate. The members of the Hungarian Guard, fuming over yesterday's verdict, are planning to join them. In fact, they are organizing the protest on their website. The Hungarian police also made clear on their website that they will disperse any such demonstration; see http://www.police.hu/tlz .

The police chief sounded very determined. One had the feeling that yesterday's verdict emboldened the Hungarian police who in the last few years had become completely demoralized. What will happen tomorrow? Hard to predict. I didn't particularly like the comments accompanying the article that appeared in Népszabadság about tomorrow's "non-demonstration." They were belligerent and ugly. They predicted civil war. However, I'm an optimistic sort. Most likely that the police will defend the square in front of parliament with a very large force and perhaps some of the extremists will think twice before going against them. And if not, and if they are injured in any way, they will soon have their spokeswoman in Brussels in the person of Krisztina Morvai.

The Hungarian Guard no more?

On paper that seems to be the case. The Hungarian Guard lost again on appeal. It was last December that the presiding judge in a lower court found the Hungarian Guard guilty of violating the rights of an ethnic group. The lawyer representing the Guard appealed. Today the Hungarian Guard both as a "cultural association" and as a "movement" was found guilty as charged. Anyone interested in the distinction between "association" and "movement" cooked up by the defense lawyer should read my blog "The Hungarian Guard: End game?" (December 17, 2008).

Fidesz issued a terse response that can be found on the party's web site: "Fidesz is a party of law and order. Fidesz, being a political organization, never expressed any opinion on court cases in the past and is not planning to do so in the future." MSZP was not so shy. István Nyakó, spokesman of the party, expressed his hope that "from today on it is clear to everyone that the Hungarian Guard is not only inhumane and unacceptable but also professes an illegal ideology and practice." He added that this is just the beginning, but at least the court of appeal made clear where the line is between free speech and fascist ideology. He expressed his hope that from here on any hidden or open cooperation with extreme groups will not be tolerated. The different Roma organizations were delighted, and one of their leaders said "an era came to a close" with this court decision.

I wouldn't be so optimistic. The Hungarian Guard has no intention of obeying the law, it seems. As soon as the news of the court decision reached some of the leaders of the Guard, they immediately swung into action. Tonight, for example, the Guard is recruiting in the city of Gyöngyös (Heves County). Gábor Vona gave a press conference at which he outlined Jobbik's determination to continue the fight. They will turn to the Supreme Court asking it to review the case. If they refuse to do so, Jobbik is going straight to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Good luck there! Vona, perhaps himself not believing in Jobbik's success at the Hungarian Supreme Court or the court in Strasbourg, warned that "this injunction will have grave societal consequences because it goes against the sense of justice of the Hungarian people." Moreover, he added, to forbid the activities of the "association" will not achieve its expected result. Because, after all, this verdict doesn't forbid the wearing of identical outfits or appearing even in large numbers in towns and villages. He added that Jobbik for the time being is not considering establishing a new organization under a different name. Vona, by the way, was in the courtroom and even before the session began he was actively promoting the Hungarian Guard. See the attached picture taken in front of the courthouse. Members of the Hungarian Guard couldn't enter the building but one older fellow got in anyway. He arrived in civilian clothes but in a bag he carried his uniform into which he quickly changed. The papers didn't elaborate what happened to him. Was he removed or not? My feeling is that he wasn't; otherwise the journalists, always eager to report something sensational, would have said something about it.

Quite independently of Jobbik's future strategy I foresee a huge legal debate ahead of us. Legal experts will argue endlessly about what Hungarian law enforcement will or will not be able to do if and when the Hungarian Guard marches out again in uniform and in military formation. I already heard one opinion on József Orosz's radio program, Kontra. The constitutional expert, István Lövétei, pretty well said that in Hungarian jurisprudence such a verdict means nothing because law enforcement simply doesn't have the "instruments" to implement it. There is absolutely nothing in the law governing freedom of assembly that would forbid the wearing of identical clothes, boots, striped kerchiefs. And there are no exclusionary provisions that would prevent assembly by an illegal group. In brief, the verdict is very nice but it has no teeth. In England, for example--he continued--the situation would be different. There a court decision automatically allows law enforcement to suppress an organization found illegal by the court. Not so in Hungary.

I'm no lawyer, but I know that Lövétei's interpretations are often very conservative, and I'm almost certain that tomorrow and the day after tomorrow there will be other jurists who will not share his opinion. Even József Orosz (also a liberal arts type like myself) inquired how the law can treat a "movement" and its outward signs separately. For instance, the boys belonging to the Boy Scout movement wear Boy Scout uniforms. The uniform is a distinguishing sign of the movement. Lövétei was not impressed.

When Tibor Draskovics, the minister of justice and law enforcement, was asked about his reaction to the verdict he didn't address any of the practical problems concerning any future illegal activities (which according to Lövétei wouldn't even be illegal). He was elated. The message for him was clear--  no one has the right to compete with the state monopoly on law enforcement. In addition, in a democratic country no one has the right to threaten others. "The Hungarian state proved that it is able and ready to defend itself against every kind of unconstitutional attempt." Nice words but the question is not only whether Hungary has a legal system that can issue an injunction against the Hungarian Guard but whether the police are strong enough to enforce that verdict. And I'm not at all sure of that. I hope I'm wrong.

Kiskunlacháza and the Hungarian National Development Agency

Yesterday I wrote about the political makeup of Kiskunlacháza, a town of 9,000 south of Budapest on the left bank of the Danube. I mentioned the very enterprising mayor who is making a name for himself in certain circles with his fierce anti-Gypsy rhetoric. The town of Kiskunlacháza is becoming notorious in other respect as well: Mayor József Répás and the town council might not have been entirely truthful when they applied for millions of forints from the National Development Agency for a school project. The National Development Agency is in charge of distributing monies received from the European Union as part of the convergence program.

First of all, I must say that Répás and the town council have spared no energy in writing grant proposals to get as much money for the town as possible. According to the website of the National Development Agency the town received altogether 375,552,750 Ft. for four different projects. Two of these involve the town's elementary school. According to the website of Kiskunlacháza there are 900 children attending the school's eight grades. The school's name is Kiskunlacháza-Áporka Általános Iskolai Társulás, indicating cooperation between the larger Kiskunlacháza and the nearby village of  Áporka (population 1,100). The school has five different "campuses." The upper four grades study on the "main campus" on Munkácsy Square while the lower grades are situated at two different locations in town. In addition there is a "special branch" for 41 students with learning disabilities. Apparently most of these students are Gypsies. In addition there is another school building in Áporka. The whole system has only one principal; the other four "campuses" are headed by assistant principals.

Although for the two school projects the town received 272,793,000 from the National Development Agency the town had to come up with an additional 318 million forints, which it didn't have. It had to borrow 284 million forints. Apparently Kiskunlacháza sometime in the 1990s was close to bankruptcy, and some people in town were afraid that history might repeat itself. Especially because the project seemed to be too grandiose for a town of Kiskunlacháza's size. The town asked for grants for two different projects: (1) to renovate the existing building on Munkácsy Square and to build a new "multifunctional" gymnasium and (2) to make the building handicapped accessible. This latter project is laudable in a country where the disabled have a very rough time. Almost nothing is wheelchair accessible. There is only one problem: the Kiskunlacháza local government in their proposal claimed that the school had 41 disabled students. Does that number sound familiar? And from here on I'm relying on Krisztina Ferenczi's articles in Népszava and Népszabadság. Ferenczi is an investigative journalist who has done a lot work uncovering political corruption cases. Mind you, in Hungary such revelations virtually never have any consequences.

The first time Ferenczi wrote about the megaproject was on January 27, 2008, in Népszava. She reported that Répás and his friends misled the National Development Agency when they claimed that there were 41 children in wheelchairs and therefore, predicted Ferenczi, it was possible that the Agency would simply not pay up. Répás claimed that Ferenczi was lying; he, in turn, demanded that Népszava print a correction. However, the paper was in possession of a document that proved that Ferenczi was telling the truth: Kiskunlacháza claimed that "by making the building handicapped accessible the town will be able to provide equal opportunity to the disabled children of the school (41 persons)." At that point Répás backed down and claimed that that was no more than "a slip of the pen." Moreover, he added that "disabled" is a word that encompasses all sorts of handicaps, including learning disabilities. Therefore there was no problem with the application and the grant.

But there are a lot of problems because the 41 "disabled" children (in reality, children in special education classes) are housed one and a half kilometers from the school in a one-story building. They will in no way benefit from the special ramps, the wheelchair accessible bathrooms, and the elevator installed at the central school. They will not be able to use the gargantuan "multipurpose" gym that can be divided up into three separate units. Here is a picture of the newly opened gym. It is quite a project for a small town. In addition they renovated the old part of the building: new windows, a new furnace, and--oh yes--an additional story built on top of the existing structure. In the new addition there are rooms for the school psychologists, for doctors' offices, separate rooms for aerobic exercises and body building "in order to expand the space for those with handicaps." The gym itself has six fixed and six movable sets of bleachers, a tennis court, a basketball court, and a separate area for badminton. The new courtyard can hold 1,000. More kids than in the whole town schooled at five different locations.

Krisztina Ferenczi visited the building site again a few months ago and wrote another article, also in Népszava (February 26, 2009), in which she elaborated on her attempts to get more information from the National Development Agency. After all, any person who is not a brainless robot should notice reading the town's application for the project that there is something wrong here. How can there be 41 handicapped children in one school district? Moreover, how it is possible that the employee in charge of the project doesn't bother to take a look at the town and its school? How can it be that this official doesn't want to meet these handicapped children? But no, it seems that this person was not interested. His only answer to Ferenczi was that "an applicant cannot lie because such untruth has consequences." Well, this was vague enough.

The official opening took place on June 26. Even Imre Szabó, minister in charge of the environment and waterways, was there. A "millennial flag" was given by the president of the Pest County Council. Oh, the good old days when Fidesz was passing out millennial flags in 2000 at the celebration of the one-thousandth anniversary of Hungarian statehood. The churches that didn't attend the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the iron curtain were out in full force to bless the new building. The National Development Agency also justified the project by declaring learning disabilities a handicap, so all's well. Meanwhile the 41 so-called handicapped children will never see the inside of the swanky gym. They exercise during the winter in the corridors and during spring and fall in a dusty courtyard.

The town now just has to pay back the 284 million forint loan. What will happen to the segregated Gypsy kids? I don't think that too many non-Roma in town care.

A return to Kiskunlacháza--An extreme right locality in Hungary

A couple of days ago I briefly mentioned that after a seven-month manhunt the police found the murderer of a fourteen-year-old girl in Kiskunlacháza, a small town south of Budapest. And I'm not using the word "murderer" instead of the customary "alleged murderer" unadvisedly. József P. not only confessed but the police found the missing belongings of the murdered girl in his house: an ID, her cell phone, a necklace, and a purse. All hidden, of all places, inside a vacuum cleaner. And yes, the DNA sample found in the semen matched. Also, the pubic hair that was reddish. The experts pretty well knew months ago that the perpetrator was most likely not a dark-skinned, brown-haired Gypsy but someone who is blue-eyed with reddish-blond hair.

This is a terrible blow to the so-called "independent" mayor of Kiskunlacháza who has made political hay out of his repeated accusations that the murderers (plural) were Gypsies. A whole gang of them. In fact, ever since last November when the murder took place, he has been doing nothing else but inciting the inhabitants of this town of 9,000 against the local Gypsies in particular and against Gypsies in general. The mayor is József Répás, who politically identifies himself as "independent" as do nine others on the town council. Among the thirteen-member council there is only one MSZP member and three who ran on the Fidesz ticket.

It is customary to run as "independent" in villages or smaller towns where everybody knows everybody and where the person means more to the electorate than party affiliation. Répás's predecessor was also an independent as were most of the council members. The lone MSZP member seems to be popular because he is reelected time and again. Learning a little bit about the town I wonder who voted for him because Kiskunlacháza's inhabitants seem to be strongly attracted to the right. Not the moderate right but its extreme variety. It is true that at the European parliamentary elections the voter turnout in town was low (34.95%) but Jobbik did extraordinarily well: 24.6% while MSZP received only 11.89%. It is enough to look at the town's website to realize that this is Jobbik country. Perhaps more than the 25% who voted for Jobbik a few weeks ago would indicate.

Anyone who would like to get a feel for the mood of the town should take a look at the video available on the town's web site http://www.kiskunlachaza.hu/. The video records the speech the mayor delivered at a town meeting on May 11. First of all, the fairly large auditorium was full. All seats were occupied and those who couldn't find a seat had to stand in the aisles. The mayor is a good-looking guy and a fairly decent speaker. At least he seems to have grabbed the attention of his audience. I am actually wondering when Gábor Vona or Krisztina Morvai will get in touch with him and put him in a top leadership role in Jobbik because his message is identical to that of their party. He told his audience that it is time to tell the truth instead of the "insidious hypocrisy" that exists in the country. In plain language, let's expose the unbearable situation that exists with the Gypsies in Hungary. (Unbearable, of course, for the non-Gypsy Hungarians.) Forceful steps must be taken because "otherwise we will all perish." The town council decided that no financial assistance will be given to those families whose children "terrorize teachers and everybody else." Families who don't teach their children to behave "should leave town." Well, that was very popular. A long rythmic applause greeted the pronouncements. The audience also loved the idea that children who don't behave will be thrown out of all the schools in town. The speech went on in this vein for about twenty minutes. It is clear that Répás, who is apparently very popular in town, has pinned his political career on Gypsy bashing.

So it's no wonder that the discovery that the murderer wasn't a Gypsy came as an unwelcome piece of news to Répás and his followers in Kiskunlacháza. The television stations interviewed not only the police chief of Pest County whose team was responsible for finding our red-headed murderer but also the mayor. In those interviews Répás doubted the police's findings that József P., the non-Roma, was alone responsible for the murder. He had to have accomplices and of course these accomplices had to have been Gypsies. Répás told his audience that the whole town is convinced that József P. couldn't have acted alone. It doesn't matter what the police say. Actually after reading a few pages of the local paper "A mi ujságunk" (Our newspaper), one could tell ahead of time that if the final result is not what the right-wingers expect, these people will turn against the police. Gyula Budai, a Fidesz member of the town council, last December wrote an open letter to the undersecretary of the ministry in charge of the Hungarian police. He accused the socialists of "demoralizing the police force." The police "are silent because you don't allow them to tell the truth." I wouldn't be at all surprised if Mr. Budai wrote another open letter to the government, contending that they forced the police to lie and arrest the wrong man while the guilty Gypsies are still loose.

Many telltale signs of the Hungarian extreme right can be found in Kiskunlacháza's local newspaper, a publication of the town council. One tipoff is that the newspaper has published a whole series of articles about Kazakhstan. The extreme right is fascinated by the Kazakhs whom they consider to be close relatives of the Hungarians. Another telltale sign is that the paper claims to be a newspaper of culture, public life, entertainment, and "guardianship of tradition." On July 1, 2007, I wrote about the "lunatic fringe" who call themselves guardians of tradition. The most incredible theories circulate about the origins and early history of the Hungarians in these circles. It seems that one of these guardians of tradition is active in local politics. Perhaps even a member of the Kiskunlacháza's town council. The town's paper began publication in 1991 but it has been available on the Internet only since March 2008. So I don't know how long the falsification of history has been part and parcel of Kiskunlacháza's local governmental politics. Just to give you an idea of the kind of nonsense  being promulgated on public money here is one example. The paper introduces an Avar leader, Khagan Bayan, with the express purpose of somehow proving that the Avars were Hungarians. (Anyone interested in the relationship between the Avars and the Hungarians should take a look at András Róna-Tas's book available on the Internet Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages  http://books.google.com/books?id=I-RTt0Q6AcYC&pg=PA116&dq=avars+turkic&hl=en.) However, the Kiskunlacháza's local expert sends his readers to http://dobogommt.hu/dobogo/figyelem.php that describes itself as a "mythical historical site." And all this on public money.

There are other problems in Kiskunlacháza but this is another story. Perhaps tomorrow another side of town government under József Répás. That's not pretty either.

Hungary and the East German "tourists"

Originally I was planning to write about the seven-month search for the murderer of a fourteen-year-old girl in Kiskunlacháza where the mayor of the town was sure that the murderer had to be a Gypsy. I wrote about the case on November 29, 2008, "A new murder and a new anti-Gypsy demonstration." A couple of days ago the real murderer was apprehended and he confessed. He is not a Gypsy but a red-haired young man who lived about 200 meters from the scene of the crime. But perhaps more about this at some other time.

Instead I would like to continue yesterday's theme--the events of the summer of 1989--because since I wrote that post I had the opportunity to read an interview with András Oplatka, the Hungarian-Swiss author and journalist (Neue Zürcher Zeitung) who only a few months ago published a book on point entitled Egy döntés története: Magyar határnyitás 1989. szeptember 11. nulla óra (The History of a Decision: Opening of the Hungarian Border, September 11, zero hour).

First a few words about András Oplatka. He was born in Budapest in 1942 and left Hungary with his parents in 1956. He attended high school and finished university in Zurich and worked for years as NZZ's correspondent in Stockholm, Paris, Moscow, and Budapest. He wrote several books both in German and in Hungarian: Hat Gorbatschow eine Chance? (1987), Der Eiserne Vorhang reisst (1990), Nachrufe auf den Ostblock (1998) Lennart meri--ein Leben für Estland (1998), Stephan Széchenyi (2004; translated into Hungarian as Széchenyi István, 2005), and Egy döntés története mentioned earlier. In addition he translated several Hungarian classics into German. His favorites seem to be Kálmán Mikszáth (1847-1910) and Mór Jókai (1825-1904), but he also translated Frigyes Karinthy's inimitable Tanár úr, kérem! (Please, Sir!) available in English on the Internet (http://mek.niif.hu/00700/00770/00770.htm).

Oplatka's book on the Hungarian decision to allow the East German refugees to cross into Austria is a thorough study based mainly on lengthy interviews with the main characters in Russia, Hungary, and Austria, as well as with Germans from both East and West. The only person he couldn't reach was Chancellor Kohl. Oplatka, just as I wrote yesterday, emphasizes that cutting a piece of the barbed wire fence was not an "opening of the borders." The decision to let the more than 60,000 East German "tourists," in reality political refugees, cross into Austria occurred on August 22, almost two months later. The decision was made by Prime Minister Miklós Németh alone, without consulting with the party functionaries, after a meeting with his advisors. Present at the meeting were Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, István Horváth, Minister of the Interior, and Gyula Borics, undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice. In addition György Jenei and László Mohai, two advisers to the prime minister, attended but didn't participate in the discussion. No minutes were taken, but Oplatka talked to all the participants and read a summary written after the meeting by György Jenei. 

Today there are some people in Hungary (I encountered one myself on the Internet) who are convinced that Németh and his government let the East Germans go because they were a financial burden on the already economically strapped country. This is of course an incredible proposition which might have something to do with the Hungarian right's reluctance to give any credit to the political leaders of the old regime. Or it may be possible that they are mixing up two events: dismantling the electronic alarm system along the border and allowing the German refugees to leave Hungary for the West instead of sending them back to East Germany. The latter was a courageous political move with far-reaching consequences. The dismanting the 260 km barbed wire fence was indeed an economic decision because Miklós Németh was horrified at how much money the government was spending on this absolutely superfluous remnant of the Cold War. Before 1955 the Austro-Hungarian border was mined so trying to escape was a risky business. However, once the Russian troops left Austria the mines were removed. I assume the Hungarian political leaders after October 23, 1956 were very sorry about this decision. Without it two hundred thousand Hungarian refugees wouldn't have been able to leave Kádár's Hungary. In 1957 the Hungarian government once again mined the border; the mines were not removed until the mid-1960s when the barbed wire electronic alarm system was introduced.

According to Oplatka, when Németh decided to get rid of the barbed wire fence he didn't think in terms of possible political consequences. However, from the beginning his policy was westward looking. His first foreign trip after becoming prime minister was not to Moscow but to Vienna to Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. Oplatka emphasizes that Németh wasn't a "reform communist." He knew that the system couldn't be reformed. He wanted to make a clean break with the one-party dictatorship and work for the introduction of a democratic regime. At the same time he maintained good relations with Moscow. Or at least Gorbachev always defended Németh and Hungary. For example, when Nicolae Ceausescu wrote to Gorbachev demanding Soviet intervention in Hungary, Gorbachev sent a copy of the letter to Németh. Or when Ceausescu and Todor Zhivkov demanded more "forceful steps" against the foreign policy of the Hungarians at the socialist summit in Bucharest, Gorbachev refused to budge.

Oplatka lauds Németh on the domestic as well as the international front. He argues first that Németh hasn't been given enough credit for his role in the change of regime. And second, "although the Hungarians didn't unite the two Germanies or Europe they made world history. The Hungarian decision notably speeded up the process."

I also heard an interview with László Kovács, currently a member of the European Commission and in 1989 an undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Gyula Horn. He repeated that opening the border for the East German refugees was the sole decision of Miklós Németh and that he didn't consult with the secretary of MSZMP, Károly Grósz. However, the Foreign Ministry handled the details. Before the 60,000 refugees en masse drove across the border on September 11 there was a "dress rehearsal," known as the Páneurópai Piknik (Pan-European Picnic). On August 19, Austria and Hungary agreed to open the border; that day 600 East Germans managed to cross to the West. The picnic was a test case to gauge Soviet reaction. Gorbachev's Soviet Union said nothing. The Hungarians could act as they saw fit.

And finally I would like to say a few words about Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai's speech last night in the Opera House. He talked about the change of regime in 1989-90 as the common cause of the Németh government and the participants in the Round Table discussions, mentioning the most important actors in the drama including Viktor Orbán. He emphasized that the most successful periods in Hungarian history occurred when there was cooperation and compromise between the government and the opposition. Moving from "existing socialism" to democracy has been (and remains) a work in progress. Hungary has achieved great things in the last twenty years, but it takes a long time to change societal attitudes. Most likely generations. It was relatively easy to write a new constitution, enact new laws, and change the economic system. But Hungary's GDP is about 60% of the European average and one cannot close this gap overnight. Hungarians shouldn't harbor false illusions. It will take time and hard work. "The catching up process is unfinished and will remain so for a long time to come." All wise words but is there anyone listening?