Hungarian Spectrum

An analysis of the Hungarian radical right

I just read a provocative piece in Élet és Irodalom (ÉS) by a "political analyst" whose name was inadvertently omitted by the designers of the Internet edition. The unnamed author sets out to challenge the accepted view of Hungarian right-wing groups. I present his/her argument here not because I embrace it but because I think that here and there it could sharpen our discourse.

The right and even the extreme right likes to call the ideology of these groups "national radicalism"--that is, allegedly a mixture of bourgeois radicalism and a Hungarian version of the narodnik ideology. Well, to my mind this is like mixing oil and water and claiming it is a natural blend; here I thoroughly agree with the author. Bourgeois radicalism (polgári radikalizmus) was basically a modern liberal ideology with very few adherents at the beginning of the twentieth century in contrast to Hungarian "populism," fashionable in the 1930s. The former group was an urban phenomenon while the latter wanted to build a society based on Hungarian peasant culture. So, according to the analyst, this self-definition is self-contradictory. After all, we are talking about two diametrically opposed intellectual trends.

People on the left refer to these right-wing groups by various names: fascist, neo-Nazi, neo-Arrow Cross (újnyílas, Hungarist), racists, anti-Semites, or just plain extremists. Although these labels may float in political discourse, they are not suitable for sorting out this rather heterogeneous mass.  These labels lump all the groups together and don't recognize the differences in their ideologies. The  extreme right groups that came into being after 2000 vary greatly in outlook and ideology. There are some--the militants--who exhibit antidemocratic tendencies, but there are others who strive for parliamentary representation.

What do these groups have in common? The author finds a common thread in a "distorted conservatism" (torz konzervativizmus). Their conservatism is a rigid, dogmatic way of looking at the past: "everything is wrong that's new." Central to their thinking are the "national traditions and national values" that, according to them, are "the core of national existence." The problem is that the national traditions they find so important don't seem to be part of today's society. As a result, a recurring theme is a lament over the disappearance of these traditions. The nation has become degenerate, it has discarded its values and its traditions and has instead become a victim to the manipulations of the consumer society. Today's Hungarians have become the unconscious slaves of capitalism and multinational corporations. The family is especially hard hit by these developments. People refuse to get married or refuse to have children, people leave the church, and instead of order there is anarchy.

The most important task of these extreme right-wing groups is to put an end to all this. They want to bring back Hungarian traditions and values and reintroduce a rigorous moral upbringing for Hungarian children. Most importantly, they want a "national awakening" from which groups considered to be alien would be excluded. Alien groups could be foreigners, Gypsies, Jews, homosexuals. The problem with all this, even from the point of view of those who expound it, is that "the existence of cultural values depends on their acceptance." Well, that's a problem; traditional Hungarian values are not uppermost in most people's minds. The extreme right, according to our author, solved the problem. Basically they elevated cultural or societal values to the status of ethical norms that exist independent of acceptance. Once Hungarian society turned away from these norms the nation fell into decline and decay.

It is difficult to place a theory of "value crisis" at the center of a political program, and therefore they resort to vague generalizations: "dissemination of education based on national values," or "care and respect of traditions." Because they don't find suitable political examples in the past, most of their traditions are "cultural." And since most of these "cultural traditions" are unknown in Hungary, they try to "revive" them or just "invent" them. One such invention seems to be a Hungarian martial art dubbed "Baranta"; another is a ball game known as "Turul." Yet another rather odd "tradition": placing somber primitive crosses on public squares at Christmas time.

This antimodernist outlook and the praise of traditionalist society reminds the author of Muslim radicals, the Taliban, and American fundamentalists who target abortion clinics. It is a well-known fact that the Hungarian extreme right sympathizes with the Palestinian cause. Only a couple of days ago there was a fairly large crowd demonstrating against Israel because of Gaza. Some of this can be explained by their anti-semitism, but it is also an expression of their instinctive sympathy toward a traditionalist society. Some groups, like Jobbik, are drawn to Iran, perhaps for historical reasons (the Hungarians and the Persians were "neighbors" at one point in their history) and also because they are attracted to an authoritarian form of government.

And finally, our author points to a resemblance between the Hungarian extreme right and Muslim societies and Hamas. Members of the Hungarian Guard are tied together not only by political beliefs;  they also form a "community." They spend their free time together, they organize all sorts of communal happenings, and they help each other in time of need. "Politics and private life are not separate. Even friendships are formed within the movement." They have been diligently building a social network and a cultural community. Hence they can be compared to some of the Mideast terrorist organizations (for example, Hamas). The author adds that the Guard isn't functioning yet at that level, but they look upon these organizations as models, and the Hungarian extreme right uses some of their methods. Our author concludes that it is a mistake to call "today's radical right" Nazi or Hungarist although there might be some who sympathize with the Nazis or Szálasi. They are not historically grounded. Rather, they are part of what might be called social networking gone bad.

Or perhaps they're modeling the Mormons. Whatever one may think of their theology, they're not a fringe element within American politics. Harry Reid, the U.S. Senate majority leader, is a Mormon.

Point counterpoint.

Ottokár Prohászka and antisemitism

There is a new controversy surrounding the unveiling of a bust of Ottokár Prohászka (1858-1927), bishop of Székesfehérvár between 1905 and his death. Or rather it wasn't so much the unveiling of the bust that ruffled liberal nerves but the speeches delivered on the occasion by two Fidesz parliamentary  members, Sándor Lezsák and Zoltán Balog.

Let me introduce the cast of characters. First and foremost the controversial bishop. As one can easily detect, Prohászka's fervent Hungarian patriotism didn't have much to do with his lineage. His father still spelled his name in its original Czech form, Prochaska, although apparently the family was already German-speaking, making its home in Moravia. Dominick Prochaska was an army officer in the imperial army and in 1857 was sent to Pozsony (Bratislava) to serve as a lieutenant. Here he met his future wife, Anna Maria Filberger of Nyitra (Nitra), whose ancestors came from Switzerland; again, the language at home was German. Why the son was named Ottokár, a very typical Czech name, is not clear. Young Ottokár decided to become a priest early in life and there is no question that he was a talented man. After his death his collected works were published in twenty-five volumes. (By the way, available on the Internet:  http://gondola.hu/cikkek/59632) He early became enamored with Christian socialism and wanted to modernize the Catholic church. The Church was not too taken with his efforts, and three of his books ended up on the papal index. After his death some of his admirers wanted to begin proceedings for his eventual sainthood, but the Church made sure that this wouldn't happen.

So he was controversial within the Catholic church and he is equally controversial outside of the church. Mostly because of his vicious antisemitism. According to most historians Prohászka's "modern" antisemitism made a real impact on the thinking of the Hungarian middle class between the two world wars. Prohászka's political views and antisemitism were based on his belief that modernity, capitalism, and the Jews are an integral part of the whole. He hated modernity, he hated capitalism, and therefore he hated the Jews. He claimed as early 1893 that for him antisemitism wasn't based on race or religion; it was a social and commercial "problem." He added: "the ulcer that is the Jewry has been gnawing at the corpus of Christian Hungarians." Even after many years, just a few years before his death, he still claimed that "Jewish ritual butchers want to shed the blood of Hungarians." The good Christian prelate used such words in connection with Jews as "perverse, cunning, immoral," he spoke of an "invasion of bed bugs, invasion of rats." And he asked: "How can we defend ourselves?" This is the man who is greatly venerated in Catholic circles today. There are several schools named after him. He already has a statue in Székesfehérvár. And now the new bronze bust in Lakitelek, at the birthplace of MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum).

About Lakitelek. Sándor Lezsák, a minor Hungarian poet, was one of the organizers of a meeting of Hungarian intellectuals to discuss the future of the country at the time when the collapse of the Kádár regime seemed imminent. Lezsák offered his backyard for the gathering. Since then Lezsák has left MDF and moved over to Fidesz where he and his fellow former MDF members of parliament established a group called Nemzeti Fórum (National Forum), a much more radical group than the majority of Fidesz members in parliament. Lezsák during the Orbán government managed to get a tidy sum of money in the form of a loan never to be repaid to build an academy of sorts. There over the years he has erected a "Christian Pantheon." Prohászka is the eighth member of the illustrious group. The others are also prominent conservative luminaries of the Horthy regime: Miklós Horthy himself, József Mindszenty, László Ravasz (a Hungarian Reformed bishop, member of the Upper House who voted for the anti-Jewish laws), Áron Márton (Catholic bishop of Transylvania), Lajos Ordass (Lutheran bishop), and Kuno Klebelsberg (conservative politician in the Horthy regime).

Zoltán Balog is a Hungarian Reformed minister who became a member of parliament only two years ago. However, he has been an "advisor on matters of theology and relations with churches" to Fidesz and also the former president of the republic, Ferenc Mádl. Apparently he is the spiritual advisor of Viktor Orbán. I assume he is the one who helps the formerly atheist Orbán find biblical themes for some of his speeches.

Both Lezsák and Balog said things at the unveiling that were inappropriate. Lezsák talked about the "spiritual terror" of a certain group the Hungarian people must suffer. He applauded Prohászka's stance against "cosmopolitan parasites." According to Balog "there is a need for the defense of the Christian faith because if we let it be taken away from us then we Hungarians will survive only in the biological sense." The reaction was immediate: Péter Gusztos, a young liberal deputy, in parliament called attention to the "outrageous speeches" made at the unveiling and accused the two Fidesz members of parliament of again courting the far right. Some of the leaders of the National Democratic Charta also expressed  their dismay and demanded that Fidesz recall the two members. Of course, that is not going to happen.

One may say that this is a storm in a teacup. For a few days we will hear a lot about Prohászka as we have been hearing about another favorite of Fidesz, Albert Wass, a Transylvanian writer of dubious talent, who was also honored with a bust in Debrecen. He died in the United States and was an energetic antisemite with a long career in different far-right Hungarian emigré publications. By themselves perhaps these cases are not terribly important, but unfortunately they signify a considerable shift to the right within Fidesz itself.

Radical right in Hungary, a new study

A few months ago I found myself under attack by some right-wingers who were outraged when I described an interview with a sociologist. The topic was the "new Hungarian right." Among other things Pál Tamás, the sociologist in question, mentioned that the extreme right has a large following in Hungary. While in most western European countries they constitute about 10% of the adult population, in Hungary their number is much larger. Then I quoted a few statistics that were indeed rather surprising. My right-wing "friends" who either don't understand English well enough or didn't read my blog carefully attributed the findings of the sociological study to me. As if I invented these figures because I am "anti-Hungarian." (In their eyes everybody is anti-Hungarian who tries to show an objective picture of Hungarian society.) As a result I found my name on a list of people who, in their eyes, are responsible for the deep division in Hungarian society. I must say that I was thrilled to be included in such illustrious company: I have a very good opinion of all those "ditch diggers," as we were called.

Well, I'm going to stick my neck out again. This time I will summarize a new, more exhaustive article written by Tamás on the same topic. First he tells his readers that although we talk a lot about the "radical right" or the "extreme right" we actually know very little about the people who fall into this category. Many questions remain unanswered. We are not at all clear about the connection between the moderate right and the extreme right. How temporary or constant are the different networks within the radical right? What are the similarities between the extreme right that existed before World War II and the radical right of today?

Let's start with the second question--the longevity of networks within the radical right. According to the existing, not too extensive literature on the subject the different movements and groupings within the radical right are unstable. It is almost impossible to keep them together for any extended period of time. Actually, one doesn't need to read this "literature" because the events of the last decade or so bear this out. In the second half of the 1990s István Csurka's MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja = Party of Hungarian Truth and Life) was strong enough to achieve parliamentary representation, and Csurka was able to turn out crowds of two hundred thousand people for MIÉP's mass demonstrations. Today MIÉP is almost dead. At the last elections MIÉP joined forces with Jobbik, another right-wing party that began as a right-wing youth organization. Jobbik means the "Better One"; the party's name is an abbreviation of Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary). They did rather poorly together and by now they are at each other's throats over money. Meanwhile there are small groups that come and go. For a while they show up at demonstrations only to disappear later. But although identifiable groups within the extreme right have a short life expectancy, the "radical camp" is quite stable.

Pál Tamás and his team (allegedly) randomly sampled 1,500 voters, in the process trying to build an algorithm by which to "monitor" radicalism. (I question the notion of a random sample because I'm not altogether convinced by the results. I have a better opinion of the average Hungarian, admittedly without a single tick of data on which to quantify my impressions, and perhaps just a case of "wishing makes it so." So for the time being I defer to statistical analysis.) They put together a number of questions designed to shed light on what makes people tick. The questions touched upon "the need for authority," "the desire to rewrite history," "a feeling of Hungarian superiority," "political antisemitism," and "anti-Gypsy feelings." With the help of answers given to the above questions the sociologists tried to place the right radicals within the context of Hungarian society as a whole. They also asked people about their attitudes toward active participation in protest movements. The most important, and disturbing, finding is that opinions associated with "right-wing radicalism" are also prevalent in the center and are present, though with less intensity, on the left. So, to summarize.

The Strong Hand. Dialogue between right and left, strengthening of democratic institutions, withdrawal of charismatic political leaders on either side--all this is totally alien to Hungarian political culture. The solution to the current situation, according to 75% of the people, would be "a strong government that would rule out party squabbles." Moreover, 52% of the people responded that "in today's situation only one party representing society as a whole is needed." The idea of a one-party system was rejected by only 28% of the sample. As for the leader, "he should be a determined man who can lead the country with a steady hand." That question, to my mind, wouldn't differentiate the left from the right; indeed, the idea was rejected by only 10.4%.

Although in the early 1990s the dividing line was not at all clear between right and left, by today people have no difficulty placing themselves on a scale of one to seven, where seven represents the extreme right, one the extreme left, and four the middle of the pack. In this sample 15.4% scored themselves as a seven, 14.4% as a six, and 14.5% as a 5. That is almost 45% of the population.

Culture of (Non-)Protest. Although the extreme or radical right is a fairly large percentage of right-wing voters, only about six percent of them would take part in street demonstrations, would attend political meetings, or would be willing to participate in strikes. The only activity they would engage in in larger numbers is to collect signatures (22%).

History. It seems that the left-liberals for the time being have lost the battle over historical interpretation. Sixty percent of the people agreed to the proposition that "today it is superfluous to talk about Hungarian responsibility and a Hungarian negative role" prior to and during World War II. Only twelve percent think that the Hungarian government before and during the war years was responsible for the disastrous outcome. Thirty-seven percent agree that "in the last eight to ten years we have been talking too much about the holocaust." (Twenty-seven percent disagree, so here the results are not so lopsided as in the question of historical interpretation.) As for the "new" symbol of the right, the red and white striped flag last used by Ferenc Szálai's Hungarian nazis, the acceptance of the flag is larger than one would suspect. While only about 30% of those asked declared themselves to be right-wingers, 37% consider "this flag part of Hungarian history and find it absolutely incomprehensible why some people are against it." The question of Trianon is also telling. The majority realizes that territorial changes are impossible, but 27.5% think that "the injustice of Trianon could be remedied only by territorial changes." (32% of Fidesz voters agreed with this statement and 22% of MSZP voters.) Thirty-six percent agree that "the most important goal of Hungarian foreign policy is to regain our leading role in the Carpathian basin. "

Prejudices. The most prevalent prejudice in Hungary is against the Gypsies. Sixty-nine percent are convinced that "Gypsies take advantage of welfare payments." Fifty percent claim that "Gypsies are responsible for their own situation." As for antisemitism the sociologists found that about one-third of the population are "active and consistent anti-Semites." There were slight changes in numbers when specific questions were asked. When they had to answer with yes or no to "Jewish culture is such that it is difficult to reconcile it to the culture of the majority" thirty-one percent agreed while twenty-seven did not. To the question "the Jews in order to achieve their aims resort to trickery" forty percent agreed while thirty percent did not. Here the difference between Fidesz and MSZP voters was fairly large: 50% in case of Fidesz and only 32% of MSZP voters. To the statement that "the influence of Jews is too great in Hungary" forty-one percent agreed (27% disagreed). Again there is a fairly large difference between Fidesz and MSZP voters (59% as opposed to 32%).

Next year, the sociologists will repeat their experiment. I'm curious whether there will be any change, one way or the other.

The Hungarian far right and David Irving

For those who don't know who David Irving is, here's a brief bio. Although he is often called a British historian, the fact is that he never finished college, and the couple of years he spent at two different universities had nothing to do with the study of history. However, he was fascinated with military history, especially German military history during World War II. Professional historians were not too taken with his work even when he stuck to military history, but they were especially critical when he began rewriting the political/social history of the war with a decidedly German slant. When he became a Holocaust denier that was too much for most countries: he was deported and barred from Germany, he was kicked out of Canada, and finally he was arrested in Austria and sentenced to three years in 2006. He spent a year in jail.

David Irving made several trips to Hungary where there are no laws against those who deny the Holocaust. Loránt Hegedüs, a Hungarian Reformed minister, was his host, and it was in Hegedüs's church that he spread his ideas.

David Irving has not been in Hungary recently, but he's once again in the Hungarian media. Irving is on a lecture tour in the United States. According to my information, an organization called Anti-Racist Action (ARA) managed to prevent Irving from giving a lecture in Washington, D.C. So he moved on to New York. Irving was obviously playing a cat and mouse game with ARA. He announced that he would speak at the Primavera Restaurant, 1578 First Avenue. That was a false address. But two people directed the arriving guests to the real site of the lecture, St. Stephen of Hungary Parish on 82nd Street.

The "small group of people" who asked one of the parish priests to allow the use of a meeting room in the church apparently didn't tell him who the speaker would be. They simply said that "they wanted the space to discuss a book." Well, in a way, that was true. According to the New York Sun (a neoconservative, pro-Israel daily) a journalist, Max Blumenthal, attended the event for a documentary he is making on Irving. According to him, Irving refused "to even use the term 'Holocaust'" in his lecture. However, he did say a few things that would be illegal in certain countries.

St. Stephen of Hungary is a church shared by Hungarians and Italians. It seems that in the past extreme right-wing Hungarians used the church for events the priests found inappropriate. And they continue their bad behavior. The ARA (who, tipped off, showed up at the restaurant and were duly directed to the church) in no time organized a sizeable group of protestors in the currently heavily Jewish neighborhood outside the church.

Now comes the question of the link between New York and Budapest. New York Hungarians claim that an extreme right-wing Hungarian group headed by Ernő Hóka often uses the church for some of his gatherings and that Hóka has close relations with Ákos Szilágyi, the founder of the New York Polgári Kör, part of the network of civic circles of right-minded people who were supposed to rally when the call came from Viktor Orbán. These civic cells at one point seemed to be critically important vehicles of Orbán's political strategy. Orbán put Csaba Hende, formerly an MDF member of parliament, in charge of the network of  cells. Hende by now is so far to the right that only a few days ago he shocked the country by suggesting that when Fidesz takes over the government they will fire all 45,000 policemen and build the force from scratch. Obviously, only those who share the values of Fidesz will be rehired. The establishment of the New York civic cell was inspired by Hende during one of his visits to New York. From the beginning the cell espoused extreme right-wing ideas and had close ties to kuruc.info.hu, a notorious neo-Nazi site advocating the overthrow of the Hungarian government. Recently the American server hosting both of these sites shut them down.

This morning Zoltán Szabó, an MSZP member of parliament, responding to the news from New York had a few choice words about Fidesz's cozy relations with extreme right-wing groups. What Szabó wanted to know was how far Fidesz is willing to go. How long can a so-called "moderate" right of center party maintain close ties with the extreme right? Szabó said that he understands that hard-core right-wing voters are important to Fidesz since they make up between 8% and 10% of the electorate, but surely, he continued, a serious party can't afford such nefarious association with neo-Nazis.

On György Bolgár's call-in show this morning Zoltán Szabó reiterated his assessment of the situation. A split second after the conversation with Szabó ended, Ákos Szilágyi, straight from New York, phoned in. He denied that he had anything to do with the invitation. That, he alleged, is the figment of the imagination of László Bartus, editor-in-chief of the Amerikai-Magyar Népszava Szabadság, who, according to Szilágyi, is a liar whom he is suing because of another article he wrote. I checked Amerikai-Magyar Népszava and there was no mention of either Szilágyi or the New York Polgári Kör. It simply said that "according to many people, the St. Stephen Parish of New York has long been a meeting place of people with Nazi sympathies." Szilágyi, by the way, also claimed that it wasn't even Hungarians who invited Irving. That is hard to believe. I became especially suspicious when ARA supporters were described as homosexuals and communists. It sounded all too familiar.

A sociological study about political radicalism

I cannot give a full description of the results of a sociological study about Hungarian radicalism in speech and action conducted by researchers of the Institute of Sociology because the results have not yet been published. I am reporting on the basis of an interview I heard with Pál Tamás, the head of the team, on Klubrádió.

The researchers conducted in-depth interviews with 1,500 people, and the results are somewhat surprising. First, the researchers concluded that the Hungarian people loath the idea of any visible protest, demonstration, any kind of force, chaos in general. They even dislike strikes. Seventy percent said that they wouldn't take part in one.

On the other hand, the findings of Tamás and his colleagues tell a more frightening story. What we considered a few years ago to be slogans and causes of the far right have found a home today in the middle of the political spectrum. Hungarian society has been radicalized. Among the many questions there were twenty-two that were provocative in the sense that the answers would give a fairly clear idea of feelings on such issues as antisemitism, xenophobia, hatred of Gypsies, Trianon, the Árpád flags, and so on. For instance, six questions were designed to elicit opinions about Jews. People were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement on a scale of 1 to 5 with such statements as "There is too much talk about the holocaust" or "Jews have too great a role in business, culture, and education." Among those who vote for right-wing parties the percentage of antisemites is 50%. Among the left-wingers 20%. In the population as a whole 30% is strongly antisemitic (Tamás called it "harcos antiszemita). Only 20% indicated strong disagreement with these statements. Trianon is another important indication of radicalism. Here 20% of the sample believed that the lost territories should be taken back, if necessary by force. What is even more disconcerting, this number is 40% among those aged 15 to 29. Sixty-five percent are openly and unabashedly anti-Gypsy. Fifty percent said that one shouldn't just talk but do something against Gypsies. Forty percent think the red and white striped flag is perfectly all right. They don't understand what all the fuss is about. (It was a historical flag used by the Hungarian Nazis in the 1940s.)

The sociologists who worked on the study don't think that this radicalization of attitudes will translate into action because Hungarians not only have a horror of demonstrations and chaos but they are also "afraid to act." So for the time being talk remains only talk. This afternoon I heard an interview with Albert Takács, former minister of justice, who reminded us of the often causal link between talk and action. But let's hope that the Hungarian phobic reaction to mass movement will prevail. It certainly has until now. Despite the opposition's nudging citizens to participate in widespread mass demonstrations that would topple the government, nothing materialized.

But it's not enough to hope that Hungarians will stay at home, go about their normal routines, and harbor ugly thoughts. Somehow attitudes have to change. For instance, I don't expect to see a Gypsy prime minister in the near future, but providing an environment where this is conceivable would be a worthy, if daunting, undertaking.