Hungarian Spectrum

The Hungarian Right: Fidesz, Jobbik and MIÉP

I read another wonderful article by Mária Vásárhelyi in ÉS (Élet és Irodalom). The title is "The Stray-away Radicals of Fidesz." A little background on Mária Vásárhelyi and the recent history of the Hungarian right. Mária Vásárhely is the daughter of Miklós Vásárhelyi (1917-2001), a journalist in 1956 who was Imre Nagy's press secretary during the October Revolution. Vásárhelyi and his family along with Imre Nagy sought refuge at the Yugoslav Embassy only to be taken to Romania. Vásárhelyi spent a number of years in jail but eventually, especially after 1963, worked as a researcher at one of the institutes of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Toward the end of his life he ran the Soros Foundation in Hungary. His daughter Mária is a sociologist and "media expert." She is also keenly interested in the extreme right in Hungary and consequently has many enemies in certain circles.

As to the background of the Hungarian right. Naturally during the Kádár regime there was no appreciable right-wing movement and one rarely heard expressions normally associated with the right. For example, antisemitism. Once the lid on public opinion was lifted, all the old prejudices surfaced again. The first such movement emerged straight from Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF), then the leading party of an allegedly moderate right-wing coalition. MDF was a mass party whose members and leaders came with very different sets of ideas. Prime Minister József Antall, an old-fashioned Christian Democrat, wasn't really representative of the party as a whole. István Csurka, a playwright turned politician, was the first within the party to manifest his dissatisfaction with Antall's MDF. Eventually Csurka left MDF and started his own party, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP). This rather cumbersome name reminds me of some of the far-right parties formed in the 1930s.

After four very difficult years the MDF coalition lost most of its supporters. By contrast, the new MIÉP gained ground. In 1994 the party was still too new to make a real difference but by 1998 it emerged as a party that passed the 5% threshold and could form a parliamentary caucus with fourteen members. Csurka's party supported the Fidesz-Smallholders government, but Fidesz obviously wasn't too thrilled with a party to its right. By moving to the right itself it managed to weaken MIÉP to the extent that in 2002 MIÉP didn't receive enough votes to be a parliamentary party. In the old days Csurka could easily get 200,000 people out on the street. But MIÉP became less and less relevant. Its place was taken by Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom), officially established in October 2003 though its leaders started their political activities earlier as a right-wing student organization. By now, according to some polls, Jobbik could get enough votes to have parliamentary representation.

And here we can turn to Vásárhelyi's analysis "The Stray-away Radicals of Fidesz." According to Vásárhelyi Fidesz, until recently supportive of Jobbik, became worried about some of the results of by-elections. There were districts where Jobbik received over 8% of the votes. That observation is not new. It's pretty obvious that Viktor Orbán has been trying for almost a decade to forge a party on the right that includes all shades of right-wing opinions, including those of the far-right. One can certainly argue about the wisdom of such a plan. From past experience conservative Hungarians ought to know that any kind of flirtation with the far-right is a dangerous game. Orbán most likely figures that once he manages to forge an "alliance" (szövetség) with all other parties to his right he will be able to sail into power and later will take care of his "allies." Just as he managed to ruin József Torgyán and his party. However, the price of such a move is pretty high. In order to earn the support of the far-right concessions must be granted. For instance, Orbán had to give István Csurka a free hand in media matters in exchange for MIÉP's support.

Vásárhelyi offers another observation that is intriguing. According to her Fidesz is turning to MIÉP in order to combat the danger coming from Jobbik. Vásárhelyi's evidence is compelling, but my feeling is that MIÉP and its aging and ailing leader is simply no match for Jobbik and Gábor Vona. However, let's see what Vásárhelyi offers to bolster her contention. First and foremost, that lately the number of Fidesz politicians who appear in MIÉP's weekly, Magyar Fórum, is growing. Just to mention a few: István Simicskó, Fidesz chairman of the parliamentary committee on national security, István Tarlós, the "independent" head of the Budapest Fidesz caucus who almost beat Gábor Demszky three years ago at the local elections, Ervin Demeter, Fidesz (earlier MDF) minister in charge of the national security offices, and Zoltán Illés, the environmental expert who is allegedly a liberal. But the most talked about was an interview with István Stumpf, the so-called independent political scientist who is actually the chief ideologist of Fidesz. That particular appearance must have been really embarrassing to the party because Stumpf's interview was published in the issue with the outrageous picture on its cover depicting György Surányi's in the middle of a Star of David. The caption read: "The Surányi Danger." That was at the time when there was talk of Surányi's becoming prime minister of Hungary.  Stumpf's picture is second on the right. A few days later István Csurka was invited for an almost twenty-minute slot on Napkelte (Sunrise, a political interview program). According to Vásárhelyi, and I think she is right, the producer of Napkelte is very savvy when it comes to political "sensitivities." In plain language, the invitation of Csurka who was practically nonexistent as far as the Hungarian media was concerned was not accidental. The journalist who conducted the interview was Gergely Süveges, not exactly a prize winner, who asked perhaps three or four benign questions and not once questioned some of the decidedly outrageous statements. For example, that the government is behind the "mob." He let the assertion that "there was no change of regime" in 1989-1990 go without any remark. Normally Süveges is not at all shy when it comes to badgering members of parliament or heads of left-liberal parties on the same program. A couple of utterances support Vásárhelyi's thesis of the existence of some kind of deal between Fidesz and MIÉP. First of all, Csurka didn't attack Fidesz as he had been doing previously. On the contrary, he announced that a Fidesz government would be supported by the population, including, I assume, MIÉP. What he suggested was "joining forces and supporting" a Fidesz government. The second remark was also telling. To the question about the efficacy of street demonstrations advocated by Jobbik, the answer was a decided no. Csurka admitted that in the past he considered politics of the street appropriate, today it is not.

Indeed, it seems that Fidesz is "trying to breathe life into its former secret ally." There are signs of a new cooperation between the two parties. For example, in Pécs where there will soon be elections for a new mayor MIÉP asked its voters to support Zsolt Páva, the Fidesz candidate. This is especially noteworthy since Fidesz considered MIÉP responsible for its loss in the 2002 elections. Csurka's party received 4% of the votes. Not enough to be represented in parliament but sufficient to cause Fidesz's failure. It was this consideration that moved Fidesz to actually support Jobbik a year later. Since it was a student organization Orbán thought that his party would be able to control the youngsters. Especially because Gábor Vona, chairman of Jobbik today, was one of the founders of a "civic organization" called Szövetség a Nemzetért Polgári Kör (Alliance for the Nation Civic Circle) that Orbán himself joined. The enthusiasm within Fidesz when Jobbik appeared on the scene was obvious. István Stumpf wrote in June 2003 that Jobbik takes up issues that used to be represented by MIÉP but without its "crude overtones." The leadership of Jobbik "is accomplished, they communicate well ... [the party] has the possibility of being the leader of the national right." Finally, Stumpf added that "MIÉP lost its vigor, it doesn't have a well chiseled message." On the other hand, Jobbik can express radical thoughts in "a more cultured fashion." Stumpf predicted that at the next elections it is very possible that MDF that stands a bit left of Fidesz and the Jobbik a bit right of it and, of course, Fidesz itself will be able to win the elections and perhaps even form a coalition government (www.ma.hu June 7, 2003).

Cultured? Well chiseled? None of Stumpf's predictions came to pass. On the contrary. Jobbik became a "monster" as Vásárhelyi called it. Vásárhelyi doesn't hide her opinion that Fidesz had a large role to play in bringing this monster to life. After all, Krisztina Morvai who heads Jobbik's EP list and who with a little luck may even go to Brussels as its representative at the European Parliament was a Fidesz creation after the October 23, 2006 events. They used her to incite public opinion at home and abroad with her "unscrupulous and primitive lies" against the government. She was greatly helped in this endeavor by the Reverend Zoltán Balog, Orbán's spiritual advisor and Fidesz parliamentary member. László Gy. Tóth, who was the chief advisor of Orbán between 1998 and 2002, today is the editor-in-chief of www.barikad.hu, a far-right website where Krisztina Morvai appears often and which is well known for its racist and antisemitic writings. Another prominent Jobbik man is Tamás Gaudi-Nagy who was also a member of the Orbán civic circle and received a prize from the organization for his tireless work for justice and democracy. Gaudi-Nagy's legal activity centered around the defense of former Arrow-Cross politicians, Hungarists, gendarmes, and members of the Lelkiismeret'88 group. As we all know, '88 equals HH, i.e. Heil Hitler.

This flirtation of Fidesz with the extreme right didn't quite work out, as is evident today. Vásárhelyi divides those who spout hate into two groups. One group consists of those who spread hatred for political gains--Fidesz and the right-wing journalists of Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hírlap, HírTV, and EchoTV. Vásárhelyi goes so far as to claim that these journalists "work to order." But the problem is that there is another group whose hate-speech is genuine. They are convinced rascists, convinced Nazis. Fidesz, according to Vásárhelyi, inflames hateful passions "for cheap tactical gains." But the "strategic hate-mongering" worked too well and not at all the way Fidesz imagined it. By now Jobbik, or those who actually believe in the Nazi dogma, threatens Fidesz's chances at the polls. Admittedly, at the moment they are leading by a mile, but MSZP voters haven't flocked to the other side. They are simply shaken, undecided, and waiting. But there is a year to go and who knows. Especially when according to some polls about 25% of Fidesz voters actually sympathize with the extreme right. According to Vásárhelyi Fidesz by now realizes that the party cannot lure back these people. Orbán is hoping to split the radical right by supporting MIÉP and thus weaken a dangerous foe whom he brought into being.

"New York Perspective"

This is the title of an article by József Debreczeni in today's Népszava. The author complains about the coverage of Hungarian politics by The New York Times and The Washington Post. I will return to the article a bit later, but first I would like to talk about the American media and Hungary in general terms. Yesterday a radio station (Rádió Café) asked me to say a few words about the American media reaction to the current Hungarian political crisis. I was on during the second half of the one-hour program on world affairs, and I don't know who came before me. However, the interviewer started our conversation with something like  "My former guests all reported that the Hungarian political crisis was really no news in their countries." So, he added, he expects the same in the United States. I corrected this supposition and said that as far as I can see the coverage is quite extensive. I mentioned specifically that The Wall Street Journal has published an article about Hungarian developments every day since Ferenc Gyurcsány's speech on March 21. I also pointed out that, as a matter of course, Bloomberg follows Hungarian events practically daily. I also told him that their reports tend to be accurate and balanced, mostly because they have correspondents on the spot as opposed to, for example, The New Times or The Washington Post. Some of the correspondents, judging from their names, are Hungarians who are able to give a fuller picture of the situation than someone who pops into Budapest from Berlin.

I mention Berlin because one of the articles József Debreczeni is complaining about was written by The New York Times's bureau chief, Nicholas Kulish, who seems to have accomplished a lot in his thirty-four years. Among other things, he wrote a well-received novel, Last One In, about an embedded journalist in Iraq. Kulish is of Croatian-German heritage and is fluent in German. Therefore, I'm certain he is thoroughly familiar with German politics. He seems to be not so well acquainted with Hungary. He most likely made a quick trip to Budapest where he fell into the trap of getting information from only one side. And this is what Debreczeni is complaining about. Kulish talks about numerous analysts but mentions by name only Ágoston Sámuel Mráz of the Perspective Institute. This think tank is basically a Fidesz creation. According to information I received from a reliable source, it was set up by a "foundation" financed by the party under the stewardship of Zoltán Balog, MP and protestant minister, who is Viktor Orbán's "spiritual father." When this institute was brought to life, after the infamous speech of Ferenc Gyurcsány became public in 2006, and when Mráz first appeared on the scene, I made fun of this young man in one of my blogs about the "political scientists" of Hungary. I don't remember exactly what the event was, but Mráz with all the self-assurance of a young man with little experience in political analysis said that something definitely would or would not happen. A few hours later exactly the opposite occurred.

In any case, Mráz studied in Germany and Balog also has good German connections. Apparently he was in the entourage of Viktor Orbán the last time the party chief visited Germany. I assume it was because of this German connection that Kulish ended up at the Perspective Institute, whose board of directors includes János Martonyi, Orbán's foreign minister, András Lánczi, a close advisor to Orbán who calls himself a philosopher, and Zsófia Vitézy, a cousin of Orbán who was brought up by the Orbán family. The person in charge of running the office is Tibor Navracsics's wife. All in all, not exactly an independent source of information.

Debreczeni wasn't happy with the coverage of recent Hungarian events by Pablo Gorondi either. His article appeared in The Washington Post. As opposed to Kulish, Gorondi's headquarters seems to be in Budapest. But he is not a correspondent of the paper; rather he works for the Associated Press. Thus, the very same article Debreczeni is complaining about appeared not only in the Post but also in the conservative Washington Times. Gorondi didn't even get to Mráz. He talked only to a certain Orsolya Milován, the "press secretary" of the Perspective Institute. No one has ever heard of her. Debreczeni found it interesting that two of the most respected American papers found this particular institute their best source of information. In defense of The Washington Post I must mention that besides the AP article they also published a report by Reuters written by Krisztina Than and Gergely Szűcs. It is factual and balanced.

One thing is sure. Fidesz is much more adroit in reaching out to foreign correspondents. According to information I received, every time there is a new reporter in town, the "party activists" with foreign language skills get in touch with him and "introduce" and "guide" him through the complicated labyrinth of Hungarian politics. This tactic is certainly good for the party, but unfortunately not for the foreign reader who would like to find reliable information about the country. From both "perspectives."

Finally, on an optimistic note. At the beginning of the blog I wrote about the very thorough coverage of The Wall Street Journal. I would like to call attention to the latest addition to the string of excellent articles in WSJ. The paper today published an analysis by Charles Forelle: "Pension Glut Lies at Heart of Crisis Wracking Hungary." http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123793340762430957.html I highly recommend it.

Viktor Orbán is moving farther to the right

Or at least this is the impression his appearances and messages of late indicate. It was in his March 15 speech that I noticed a fairly sharp turn to the right but since then the signs of a profound change in tactics are visible. Or at least I noticed a change.

Although most papers and politicians were happy that the national holiday passed in relative calm, Orbán and Fidesz decided that they could not miss an opportunity to criticize the government and the police for their alleged wrongdoings. First, it seems to me, they laid some traps for the police. The most glaring was the following provocation. Two men held up a banner reading: "Responsible government to Budapest." The police, who most likely received instructions that no banner can be displayed during certain events, asked the two men to put away the white sheet with the slogan. The slogan wasn't the same but very similar to one of the twelve demands of the revolutionaries in 1848. The original demanded a "responsible ministry," presumably a ministry dealing with Hungarian affairs, in Pest-Buda. Surely, the policemen in charge didn't have the foggiest idea about the connection between the banner and the events of 1848. I happened to see the encounter between the two men and the police and I must say that it was most civilized. The policeman politely asked and the two guys politely obliged. However, they were arrested. A huge outcry followed on the right. Surely, this is dictatorship when two peaceful men cannot display a famous slogan from 1848. Not only that. After they were arrested they were strip searched and left for hours without food or drink.

The first paper to report the news was Magyar Nemzet. The paper referred to one of the men as a lawyer, but as it turned out he was actually a former employee of the paper. He was also one of the publishers of another right-wing paper, Heti Válasz. In addition, he currently serves as a member, nominated by Fidesz, of the committee dealing with complaints, mostly political in nature, of ORTT (Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület). ORTT is the body overseeing the affairs of radio and television stations. But this journalist-lawyer-politician wasn't the only one who decided to entrap the police. Another one who appeared with a huge book on the life of Stalin was once the press secretary of the ministry dealing with family questions under the Orbán government. So much for political mischief. On the first picture one can see the lawyer-journalist-politician while on the second one the former press secretary in the Orbán government.  And  if that weren't enough Zoltán Balog, Fidesz chairman of the parliamentary committee on human rights, initiated an immediate investigation of the wrongdoings of the police on March 15. Máté Szabó, ombudsman in charge of complaints concerning such wrongdoings, also decided to move into action. Perhaps it is not immaterial that Szabó is a Sólyom appointee. He has been superactive ever since he received his appointment and this superactivity seems to be coupled with paranoia. The other day he was investigating a death that occurred in the Kaposvár prison and his parked car was involved in a traffic accident. He indicated his strong suspicion that the local police out of vengeance ruined his car!

Now I don't know why these men were arrested. But obviously they were in violation of some Hungarian law that both Fidesz and the police knew well. The law, I assume, is petty enough to make the police seem heavy-handed and the arrestees innocent victims. In brief, Fidesz criticizes the government for weakening the police, they keep demanding a strong and disciplined police force, but at the same time they do everything in their power to make the Hungarian police as impotent as possible. After a while, the police will not dare to do anything because of the consequences they might suffer. And, of course, it will be the fault of the government.

All these provoked incidents provided Viktor Orbán with an opportunity to repeat time and again that he was perfectly right when he talked about the restoration of socialist dictatorship. While after his relatively moderate speech on March 6 he made his rounds on respectable, run-of-the-mill television stations, this time he decided to visit EchoTV and the extreme right paper Magyar Hírlap. Both are owned by Gábor Széles, a billionaire of extreme views. Until now Orbán was careful about not associating himself with Széles's media empire. But for one reason or other he now thinks that it's necessary. My guess is that Fidesz must have some polls for internal use only that indicate that Jobbik and other right-wing groups are gaining ground at the expense of Fidesz. This news must be behind the rather sharp turn to the right. At Echo TV he again repeated that Fidesz is keeping tabs on the illegal moves of the government and when they are in charge "these people will be punished." The policemen ought to be the most afraid: they are gathering information on them. They know who was where and did what! In plain language Orbán is quite openly intimidating the police!

Orbán in the same interview at Echo TV made a couple of other "interesting" observations. He tried to explain better what he meant by "socialist restoration." Of course, he wasn't speaking of the restoration of a "socialist society" because then "there would be work for everybody and there would be public safety." The current government doesn't want to restore the socialist order but rather a dictatorial form of exercising power. It wants to create a regime very similar to or the same as one-party rule. He had the temerity to say that it is the other side that intimidates people. Especially since only a few minutes later he threatened the whole police force. He continued that he is certain that "even people of socialist persuasion" will reject this "socialist restoration." He is sure that the Hungarian people are witnessing the end of that restoration attempt. Over 50% of the public wants change and there will be change soon.

The next day Orbán visited Magyar Hírlap, the newspaper that employs Zsolt Bayer, the notorious antisemite whose so-called journalistic activities are a disgrace. By the way, Bayer was one of the founders of Fidesz and a close friend of Viktor Orbán. Here he emphasized the necessity of a united right. He more or less repeated his thoughts uttered earlier at Echo TV about the police, the government, the socialist restoration, punishment of the guilty, and the happy days that await the nation after the change of government. In addition, he decided to say a few nasty things about MDF and its chairman, Ibolya Dávid. He called Dávid's move to promote Lajos Bokros "jokes of a clown." MDF didn't leave Orbán's remarks unanswered. It considers what Orbán has been doing for years the "acts of a clown." He loudly demands change but when there was an opportunity to change prime ministers, he ran away.

There are people who wouldn't agree with me about Orbán's move to the far right. They think he has been there for some time by now. They point out, rightly, that in Hungary there has never been a moderate right as there were no liberals either. That's why Ibolya Dávid and SZDSZ have such troubles gathering strength. Some people would go so far as to say that one cannot build a democracy without democrats. Historically, I agree with the above assessments. Indeed, there has never been a moderate conservative base in Hungary and with the exception of Budapest between the two world wars there were no liberals either. The only thing I can't decide is who Viktor Orbán actually is. An irresponsible demagogue who says what his audience wants to hear? Was he ever a liberal? Was he ever a conservative? Is he now a representative of the far right? I honestly do not know.

Aftermath of the night club murder

Nothing happens in Hungary that does not have political consequences. The lethal stabbing of a famous handball player was not just a tragic incident; it also became the center of a petty and unbecoming political feud. It was bad enough that once it became known that the perpetrators were Gypsies there was an outcry against "Gypsy crime." This sad event was also exploited for political gain. Fidesz went into high gear, attacking the government for not providing security for the citizens of the country. They claim that the police force is underfinanced, its size inadequate and, most importantly, it can't keep order. It commands no respect.

Unfortunately some of these accusations are not entirely unfounded although their statistical underpinnings leave something to be desired. Fidesz claims, for example, that the police are receiving 15 (sometimes this figure becomes 35) billion forints less for the 2009 fiscal year than they got a year ago. Actually the sum allotted for police work in 2009 is exactly the same as in 2008, but over the course of last year the police needed extra financing because of unforeseen (and hence unbudgeted) expenses. Just to give one example: all those demonstrations that needed new equipment, more policemen, and extra money. Most of these demonstrations, including the huge Fidesz open air gatherings, cost the police a great deal of money. If 2009 is as "busy" as last year (let's hope it won't be) then the police will receive extra money as needed. In fact, after the sad events in Veszprém the police force budget was increased by 3.5 billion. The response when this was announced on Sunday after the extraordinary cabinet meeting: "What good does the 3.5 billion do when they received 15 billion less in the first place?" One cannot win against people with an infinite talent for twisting the truth.

Most likely the Hungarian police could use twice as much money as they are receiving currently, but considering that the opposition is the most vocal critic of overspending it is interesting that any kind of savings is immediately criticized as "unacceptable." The claim that extra money spent on the police would result in budgetary reductions elsewhere doesn't make an impression. Everything needs more money, says the opposition.

I personally think that the problem is not so much one of money as what one might call police paralysis. For years now the policemen simply don't know what they are supposed to do. One day they are criticized because they are not tough enough and the next day they are called to task for being brutal. As some of the more outspoken government members argue, Fidesz has tried its best to weaken the Hungarian police force and now complains that the police are unable to keep order. The real attacks on the police came after October 23, 2007, when there were serious disturbances on the streets of Budapest. I watched a live broadcast of the events on the Internet and was surprised at the restraint of the Hungarian police while under physical attack. I watched with morbid fascination how the policemen retreated while thugs were throwing cobblestones at them. Hundreds were injured. More injuries among the police than among the rock throwers. Any other police force in Western Europe or in the United States in a similar situation would have been a great deal tougher. Yet "legal defenders of civil rights" close to Fidesz immediately began attacking the police for brutality. Krisztina Morvai, far right "defender" (by now a member of Jobbik), repeatedly told the world that thirteen people's eyes were shot out by rubber bullets. Proof? Unnecessary. She and Zoltán Balog, the great diplomat of the latest Slovak-Hungarian meeting, even went abroad to tell about the brutal Hungarian policemen and to ask for international condemnation. Some of the policemen were convicted in Hungarian courts (though they received suspended sentences) while one attacker after the other got off scot free. After that, it was not at all surprising that at the gay parade incident the policemen just stood by placidly while the anti-gay "gentlemen" spat on them. This is what happened to the Hungarian police force with Fidesz assistance.

But now Fidesz is demanding a tough police force that can keep order because "the government isn't doing anything." The party set up a "workshop" to outline a plan to introduce tougher laws and more effective police. They are promoting the "three strikes and you're out" policy some states in this country introduced. The third felony, life without parole. I just heard yesterday that prison overcrowding in California is so severe that about 170 thousand inmates should be let go. Well, somehow I can't see that happening in Hungary and not just because of the shortage of prisons. Such "innovation" flies in the face of the whole European justice system. Not only that, there is no way the parliament would vote for such a change in the criminal code.

Meanwhile, Viktor Orbán after a visit to László Sólyom announced that the number of crimes committed by Gypsies is growing. As we know, no ethnic statistics are kept. When another Fidesz politician was asked by a reporter where Orbán got this information, the only answer the Fidesz politician could come up with was that "the Miskolc police chief said so." Full circle, I'm afraid. 

Fidesz diplomacy?

It is hard to call the joint meeting of the Slovak-Hungarian parliamentary committees on human rights anything other than a fiasco. Or a scandal. And the man who is responsible for it is Zoltán Balog, a confidante of Viktor Orbán. Balog is a Hungarian Reformed (Calvinist) minister who offers spiritual guidance to Orbán. Balog is a newcomer to politics. He became a member of parliament only in 2006, but his party immediately named him chairman of the Committee on Human Rights, Minorities, and Religious Affairs. Some people find the notion of Balog as the guardian of human rights and  minorities akin to the fox guarding the hen house because he made some derogatory remarks about homosexuals whose rights this committee is supposed to defend.

As far as I can piece things together the background of the "non-meeting" is as follows. Katalin Szili, speaker of the house, is concerned about the state of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. She often makes trips to Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia. She came up with the idea of a joint session of the Slovak and Hungarian parliamentary committees on human rights in Budapest. (The Slovak committee has members representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.) Szili's idea was that such a meeting would help to forge better relations between Slovakia and Hungary. She even tried to mitigate risk: she had a chat with Balog, took a look at the agenda, and when Balog mentioned that he would like to show a video of the soccer match at Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely) where the Slovak police roughed up some Hungarian fans, Szili expressed her misgivings and made Balog promise to drop the idea. Well, Balog promised, but the good minister didn't keep his word. Apparently, a discussion of the ill-fated soccer match was scheduled to be the last item on the agenda, but Balog insisted that the video be shown first, before any discussion.

The Hungarian members gathered first, and Balog tried to convince them to show the video, to no avail. Meanwhile the Slovaks were waiting in the corridor. Apparently close to forty-five minutes. Eventually Balog went out to meet them and explained what he was trying to do. At that point the Slovaks turned around and left the building and the Hungarian capital. Szili was furious and accused Balog of making Slovak-Hungarian reconciliation impossible. There was a segment on TV2 news that showed the two of them. Balog tried to convince Szili that all would be well, while Szili countered that "after this, it will be difficult." She also added that she finds Balog alone responsible for this very unfortunate event.

Balog's initial defense was that his was the only possible reaction to the Slovaks' refusal to admit that the police attacked the Hungarian fans with no provocation. Truth is more important than "politeness." Basically, the hell with diplomacy. The argument that such incidents between the two countries might have a negative effect on the Hungarian minority's situation in Slovakia didn't seem to make an impression on Balog. Moreover, Balog's party came out with its big guns. Yes, good relations are fine but "there are questions that must be settled before we can move forward on any other issues.... No diplomatic politeness can take precedence over the duty of a Hungarian parliamentary member to defend the personal safety of Hungarians within and without the borders."  Further, "Fidesz wants to avoid the appearance of such a misconception that one can do anything with Hungarians." The communiqué added that the current Hungarian foreign policy "is weak and dishonorable" and should be replaced by one that "is based on mutual respect, personal freedom and safety" among countries.

In light of the uniformly negative reaction in Slovakia, a day later Balog changed his tune. He was criticized not only by Slovaks but also by Hungarians within Slovakia. For instance, the Hungarian party in Slovakia (MKP) expressed its misgivings. The Slovak parliamentary committee's chairman, a Hungarian, was responsible for his committee's abrupt exit from Budapest. So Balog, the quintessential diplomat, wrote a letter to the chairman of the Slovak committee in which he first expressed his total bafflement over why the Slovaks refused to enter the room. He added that he was convinced that "there was no alternative to discussion" and therefore he asked them to return to the negotiating table. His ultimate concession was geographical. The meeting didn't have to take place in Budapest; it could be scheduled either in Győr or in Mosonmagyaróvár, closer to Bratislava. Or, if the Slovaks preferred, Balog and his fellow committee members would be ready to go to the Slovak capital.

This conciliatory moment was soon swamped by a litany of Slovak sins against the Hungarian minority. There are several laws that discriminate against the Hungarians in Slovakia and "we cannot accept this, and we hope that soon enough [the Slovak government] will also recognize that such a situation is unacceptable." To add insult to injury, Balog commiserated with the Hungarian chairman of the Slovak committee: how difficult it must be for a Hungarian to lead a Slovak parliamentary committee! Finally, he repeated that he still wants to keep on the agenda the topic of the soccer game and what happened there.

What do you think? Will there be another meeting? I doubt it.