Hungarian Spectrum

Hopes and fears in Hungary: Elections of 2010

A few days ago József Debreczeni wrote an opinion piece in Népszava (May 13) entitled "After Pécs--Before Mohács." Even a cursory knowledge of Hungarian history and current politics is enough to figure out Debreczeni's message. He wrote after the huge Fidesz victory at the mayoral elections in Pécs (May 17). And Mohács was the scene of an overwhelming defeat for the Hungarian forces against the Turkish invaders in 1526. Mohács for Hungary is what Kosovo is for the Serbs.

Debreczeni, who is often accused of having an Orbán phobia, is pessimistic about the political future of the country. He is certain that Orbán's instincts are undemocratic and that if his party wins a two-thirds majority of the seats in parliament Hungarian democracy is in jeopardy. The provision that was supposed to ensure consensus and stability in Hungarian politics, requiring a two-thirds majority for some types of legislation to pass, has a dark side in the event of a political landslide. The constitution can also be changed by a two-thirds majority. After Pécs, where Zsolt Páva (Fidesz) received a two-thirds majority in a socialist stronghold, Debreczeni envisages a parliament in which there will be a Fidesz two-thirds majority which will enable Viktor Orbán to do whatever he wants. Theoretically, Fidesz could abolish the republican form of government and turn Hungary into a kingdom. Well, that's unlikely, but there have been talks in Fidesz circles about widening the powers of the president. Perhaps lengthening his term of office from five years to, let's say, eight. And he would be elected by the people rather than by parliament.

Over the last three or four weeks Orbán has sent mixed messages on the question of the potential two-thirds majority. Before Pécs he tried to minimize the possibility of such a huge victory. He kept saying that "it was impossible to win that big" in the Hungarian system. As the matter of fact, the opposite is true. The winner is favored. The party receiving X percent of the votes usually ends up with greater than X percent of the seats. Everybody assumes that Orbán desperately wants to get more than 66% of the seats but he is afraid to talk too openly about his dreams because of a possible backlash from the other side. The socialists and liberals might get frightened and go out to vote not so much for MSZP or SZDSZ but against Fidesz. After Pécs Orbán changed tactics. He didn't mention the magic "two-thirds" but rather talked about a "strong and stable majority." It was clear that what he had in mind was a win that would allow the party to make fundamental changes. He emphasized the unity of the right that would re-create a victory such as Páva achieved in Pécs. Here Orbán was talking to those radicals who had voted for Fidesz in earlier elections but who by now are thinking of voting for Jobbik. The message is: don't vote for Jobbik, vote for Fidesz because it is Fidesz that is capable of achieving the two-thirds majority that would make that "regime change" you people are hoping for.

The reaction was immediate on the other side, but Orbán didn't fine tune his message. The only "constant" variable was the probability of winning a two-thirds majority. A few days later he gave an interview in Népszabadság in which he said that he "saw no possibility" for a two-thirds majority, but if his party achieves such a feat "he will take advantage of it." Tibor Navracsics, head of the Fidesz caucus, tried to allay fears by saying that if Fidesz wins a two-thirds majority they will use the opportunity "to strengthen democracy and the republic." Navracsics was vague but István Stumpf, nowadays "independent political scientist" but formerly minister running the huge prime minister's office, offered a few concrete examples. For example, a radical decrease in the size of parliament. Of course, this is a good idea but until now the parties have been unable to agree on the numbers because each party tried to cherry-pick the number of seats and the method of elections that best suited its own chances. If Fidesz had the necessary two-thirds majority they could pick the size of parliament that would serve its purposes and its alone. Stumpf even mentioned the possibility of creating a second house, perhaps made up of appointed members of different interest groups. (This sounds like a clone of the largely fictitiously-based body that make decisions on the media.)

Debreczeni is not alone in his fears. By now even MSZP politicians are worried. Attila Mesterházy, the new head of the MSZP caucus, for the first time used really, really strong language. Unusual for MSZP. He said: "People, please wake up because an entirely new world is awaiting us unless we do something." Several times he repeated Orbán's slogan: "We have had enough" of what Fidesz is doing. But one doesn't have to go as far as MSZP. Tamás Bauer, a former SZDSZ member of parliament, is convinced that Orbán will use the opportunity to change Hungary's constitution to his own advantage. Bauer contends that a Fidesz two-thirds majority "would pose a serious danger to Hungarian democracy." According to him, Orbán in this case would have greater power than János Kádár ever had.

Political observers have offered a list of possible changes Fidesz would make to the constitution. They would definitely widen the power of the president, they would perhaps introduce a second house, they would give citizenship to Hungarians living in the neighboring countries that would ensure a Fidesz victory for a long time to come, they would pick their own chief justice of the supreme court and the judges of the constitutional court, they would reduce the size of parliament, they would change the boundaries of electoral districts, they would change the form of financing of political parties, and they would most likely suspend the immunity of parliamentary members from criminal prosecution. After that the show trials could come. It is the last point that makes people so nervous and lends credence to the other hypotheses. Because if Orbán is sure that MSZP politicians are criminally liable for the impoverishment of the country, he and his fellow Fidesz leaders could turn to the prosecutor's office and ask for an investigation right now. Why wait?  References to criminal investigations once Fidesz comes in power makes some people apprehensive.

Of course, it is possible that Fidesz will not receive such an overwhelming number of seats and, even if it does, perhaps it will not use its power ruthlessly. However, Tamás Bauer remembers vividly that his Fidesz colleagues during the period between 1994 and 1998 when the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition actually had a two-thirds majority laughed at them. Not taking advantage of it? Using restraint? "You are stupid," they said. Perhaps they were.

Hate-speech: the fourth round

This is the fourth time that the socialist and liberal members of parliament have tried to do something about the ever-growing  spread of linguistic abuse of certain groups. The favorite targets are the usual suspects: Gypsies, Jews, and gays. The linguistic abuses are not mild. At soccer games between the Fradi (Ferencváros) and MTK (a team formerly with lots of Jewish players) the Fradi fans keep chanting: "The trains are going to Auschwitz." Or at liberal demonstrations the extreme right wingers "send the Jews into the Danube" just like in the winter of 1944 when the Arrow Cross men gunned down members of the Budapest ghetto and threw their bodies into the Danube. The verbal (and sometimes physical) abuse of Gypsies is very common and again there is nothing a member of these groups can do. As of last year the gays were also verbally and physically attacked. So it's no wonder that some people believe that something must be done.

However, there is a very serious problem: the Hungarian Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court. According to the Constitution free speech has a paramount role in Hungarian law similar to the American practice. Those who argue for restrictions on free speech point to the 400,000 Hungarian Jews who were shipped off to Auschwitz and other death camps with active Hungarian participation. These people point out that the Nazi atrocities began with words that eventually were translated into action. They also highlight the growing verbal and physical violence that is becoming far too common. They claim that in 1990 when the Constitution was written it was an entirely different world. There was no deep division between right and left, and the extreme right either didn't exist or constituted only an insignificant force. It was also a time of limitless hope in the democratic instincts of people and the strength of democratic institutions. They couldn't even imagine people chanting little rhymes about sending people to Auschwitz.

President Sólyom, we mustn't forget, had a large role to play both in framing and in interpreting the Constitution. He has always rigidly maintained that free speech is more important than human rights. For the sake of free speech we must endure a certain discomfort. Therefore it is naive of the left even to try to come up with a piece of legislation that will pass muster. There have already been three attempts to change the law, all of which failed. Only a year ago parliament tried to make a change in the Civil Code to allow members of targeted groups to sue even if the verbal attack wasn't directed at them personally. Sólyom didn't like it, sent it to the the Constitutional Court, and, behold, big surprise, the Constitutional Court agreed with former Chief Justice Sólyom that it was unconstitutional. Soon enough the socialists and liberals began drafting a new piece of legislation, this time through a change in the Criminal Code: T/6219 was passed on November 13. The proposed legislation would allow a person who considers himself a member of a group that is being abused to go to court and demand satisfaction. The legislation was sent for signature to President Sólyom who decided that this new piece of legislation is also unconstitutional and therefore he is going to send it on to the Constitutional Court to have an official judgment on the question. What are his objections? According to him, the proposed legislation doesn't provide any test to decide whether the injured party is part of the group that is being abused. Sólyom goes even farther: he would like to know whether the person in question has a "strong enough bond" to that community. This is an incredible idea. First of all, how can a Gypsy or a Jew prove with certainty that he is a Gypsy or a Jew? A bodily examination in the case of a male Jew? Most Hungarian Jews are not even circumcised. And what about women? Or will it be necessary to produce a family tree going back generations and generations when birth certificates still indicated one's religion? As for a gay person, should he have to perform a sexual act in front of the judges to prove that he is gay? Because otherwise I have doubts that you can ascertain someone's heritage or sexual orientation. As for the "strong enough bond" that sounds even more bizarre. Let's say that a Jew isn't religious and doesn't go to synagogue. Does this mean that he's not a Jew? Or take a gay person who is in the closet and doesn't go to gay bars. Does it mean that he has no right to feel offended? Or a Gypsy who went to university and doesn't live in a hut in one of the village ghettos? The whole thing is nonsense. But never mind, I''m certain that on these grounds the Constitutional Court will completely agree with the great constitutional expert.

Political odds and ends after the Hungarian budget debate

This blog will be something of a hodgepodge because today's news consisted of a series of sound bites that by themselves don't deserve deep analysis. Or perhaps it would be better to say that I don't know yet whether they have any significance. The first piece of news that grabbed my attention this morning was that the liberals who yesterday said that they had decided to vote for the budget for patriotic reasons by today were somewhat sore and acted as if they were not very happy with the outcome. I guess one reason for their letdown is that SZDSZ's votes didn't matter. They now talk about the "Janus-faced MDF" because they came to the conclusion that it was actually MDF votes that saved the government's budget. Poor MDF had been accused earlier of lending a helping hand to MSZP; now here it is in black and white that the MSZP government's success actually hinged on MDF's cooperation. Fidesz will make hay out of this, I'm sure.

I mentioned yesterday that there were three independent members who voted with the government. One of these was actually kicked out of the Fidesz delegation only about a month ago because several times he didn't follow caucus instructions and voted differently from the other Fidesz representatives. His name is Antal Császár and I must say that he is an odd man out in the Hungarian parliament: he is actually a worker. He did not go to college and for years he worked as an engine fitter in a coal mine. In the 1990s he learned a new trade: how to make pálinka. Pálinka is a traditional brandy made out of fruits, especially apricots, plums, or pears. Pálinka is also known in Romania and Slovakia, but, according to an EU ruling, only pálinka made in Hungary can be considered genuine pálinka within the European Union. In my childhood making pálinka was a state monopoly but almost everybody who had a few fruit trees engaged in illicit distillation. I must say that in the good old days pálinka was a lowly kind of drink, but lately I see that it is considered elegant and some of the brands are pricey. It seems that Császár flourished as a distiller of pálinka because he became head of the Party of Entrepreneurs. It was as a delegate from this party that he entered the Fidesz caucus. To return to Császár, the independent. Ferenc Gyurcsány was so grateful that he immediately offered Császár a government post: commissioner for the distribution of the 1,400 billion forint package designed to bolster the Hungarian economy. Császár accepted. HirTV immediately inquired "How much was the blood money?" I wouldn't be surprised if in 2010 Császár were on the MSZP list.

Another interesting event this morning was an interview with Ferenc Gyurcsány on Napkelte. The reporter was Kata Apáti-Tóth, a newcomer to the show after, on Fidesz's insistence, the "liberal" journalists were booted out by the president of MTV. Apáti-Tóth is young and quite good looking but her depth of knowledge of even current events is not too impressive. One has the feeling that the day before the program she sits down with a list of questions which have only one aim: to say something nasty about anything the guest says. So if Gyurcsány says something quite ordinary like big reforms cannot be introduced without the help of the whole society, then Apáti-Tóth will say: "But you're governing." Or if Gyurcsány complains about the opposition's unwillingness to cooperate, then Apáti-Tóth will say: "Why don't you invite Viktor Orbán for a chat?" Of course, she should know that Gyurcsány invited Orbán several times and Orbán refused. Gyurcsány throughout the interview had a kind of forgiving smile on his face while he tried to explain the facts of life to the reporter. It wasn't an easy job. Out of the whole interview only one thing captured the media's imagination: Gyurcsány said that he is just waiting for the final passage of the budget on December 15, and after the holidays he will continue with his reforms. Reforms, reforms? What kind of reforms?

Another memorable moment came at the end of the interview when Apáti-Tóth inquired from Gyurcsány what he thought of President Sólyom's latest brainchild: the Council of the Wise Ones, which came into existence yesterday. I'm not kidding. This is the name of it. Only in a country where respect for authority is as high as it is in Hungary could anyone come up with such an idiotic designation. You can well imagine what Gyurcsány thinks of it, but he was polite. The Council is supposed to deal with education and corruption because Sólyom thinks that these two topics need urgent attention. How four people, two of whom don't even live in Hungary, can do anything practical about either education or corruption I haven't got the foggiest. Gyurcsány smiled sweetly and said that if he wanted to be ironic he would say that government doesn't work that way, but if the president wants to set up a Council of the Wise Ones he can. But, he added, "we don't have half a year to write studies."

Peter Rona's ideas on the Hungarian economy and society (I)

Peter Rona (or Róna Péter) had a distinguished career in the financial world. He was only fourteen in 1956 when he left Hungary with his parents. The family headed for the United States where Peter graduated with a major in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 1964 (an institution, by the way, known as a powerhouse in finance, home to the Wharton School, the first collegiate business school in the U.S.). He then went to Oxford where he received another degree in 1966. I couldn't find details, but as far as I know he also has a law degree and was a member of the New York bar. For a while he worked for a Washington law firm and from 1971 on at Schroders Bank. Eventually he became CEO of Henry Schroder Bank and Trust, at that time both an investment bank and a global asset management firm.

Sometime after the change of regime he returned to Hungary and began writing articles, mostly on economics. Recently he became adjunct professor of economics at ELTE and the number of his publications multiplied. The latest is a three-part "opinion piece" that appeared in Népszava (September 2, 3, and 4, 2008). It is a thorough examination and critique of Ferenc Gyurcsány's "Compact."  His overall verdict is that Gyurcsány is "the first Hungarian politician in the last eighteen years who instead of engaging in political skirmishes is trying to find solutions." The first part's title is "State, Citizen, Trust." The second, entitled "Competitiveness," explains in layman's terms why the Hungarian economy is not competitive at the moment. The title of the last article in the series is: "About Taxation in Black and Grey."

I think his analysis is incisive enough that I will spend three days on it. Today I will deal with Rona's ideas on the relationship between state and citizen. Rona begins with the constitution.

Let me interject a few words about the history of the Hungarian constitution. I can be very brief because there was no written constitution in Hungary until 1949 when Mátyás Rákosi's communists created one based on Stalin's 1936 Soviet constitution. At the time of the change of regime from a one-party dictatorship to democracy this constitution either had to be modified or an entirely new constitution written. The members of the Oppositional Round Table (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, 1989) opted for the former; they asked a group of constitutional lawyers to work on rewriting the old constitution. A standard joke is that they tinkered and tinkered until only one sentence remained unchanged: The capital of Hungary is Budapest. Well, this is a bit of an exaggeration. Unfortunately, quite a few provisions remained. For instance, there are state obligations that are impossible to fulfill. One day I will comb through the constitution and find some examples.

But let's see what Rona has to say about this constitution as it evolved from its communist incarnation. The 1949 constitution, he contends, put all the responsibilities on the state but at the same time demanded total obedience from the citizenry. The new (revised) constitution left all the obligations of the state intact while it lifted all the obligations of the citizens in the name of freedom. So the new Hungarian constitution became a lopsided document, and the Constitutional Court (a new institution in the Hungarian judicial system), instead of trying to bring individual freedom and governmental responsibility into greater balance with its decisions, made things worse. By the way, Rona takes a swipe at the Constitutional Court by calling its members people of "modest ability." Rona believes that Hungary should start from scratch and write a new constitution. However, both President Sólyom, previously chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and the current chief justice think that the constitution is fine as is.

Rona argues that the Hungarian people still think that "Uncle State" (Állambácsi) ought to take care of them, but at the same time the Hungarian citizen doesn't trust the state. And, on the other side, the state doesn't trust the citizens either, and with good reason. According to Rona, Gyurcsány perceives the mutual distrust but doesn't really understand its cause. Rona, I think correctly, points out that the Hungarian people are no more prone to immorality and corruption than any other national group. Sure, there are real crooks in Hungary, but there are real crooks everywhere. The problem is not with morality but with the legal system and the functioning of the state. Corruption is prevalent in countries where "normal things cannot be taken care of in a normal way." And, he adds, where "bad things are not punished properly." Thus, Rona says, the functioning of the state must be repaired first and only then one can expect the people to be law abiding citizens. There is a great deal of truth in this. Just as in Rona's other two installments. But you'll will have to wait until tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. A real cliffhanger for policy wonks!