Hungarian Spectrum

Hungary, her neighbors, and Viktor Orbán

Viktor Orbán and foreign policy is a lethal combination. During his tenure as prime minister he managed to alienate practically all the neighbors with the possible exception of Franjo Tudjman's Croatia. In fact, Orbán was the only foreign political leader to attend Tudjman's funeral in 1999. All  others boycotted the funeral because of Tudjman's human rights record. Orbán managed to have strained relations with George W. Bush, who should have been an obvious ally. Instead, Bush refused to meet with him. He irritated Romania and Slovakia with his insistence on the introduction of a "Hungarian identification card" that gave special privileges within Hungary to those who claimed Hungarian nationality. He brought up the question of the Benes doctrine (1945) that made the Germans and Hungarians of Czechoslovakia collectively responsible for the destruction of Czechoslovakia. The law that resulted in deportation of and discrimination against Germans and Hungarians was allowed to lapse a few years later but was never officially abrogated. Out of the blue Orbán decided to bring up the issue, demanding official action. The Slovak reaction was predictable. No way. The Benes doctrine remained on the books. He attacked the Austrians for illegally buying up land close to the Austro-Hungarian border and threatened severe punishment. Russia was, of course, the arch enemy. His only friend was Silvio Berlusconi who campaigned on his behalf in 2002 and whom Orbán recently visited again.

For the time being Orbán is only hoping (expecting) to be the next prime minister of Hungary, but his not so beneficial influence on foreign policy is already being felt. The latest imbroglio came from a speech he made in Esztergom on May 23, 2008. It was a joint affair with the current head of the Slovak MKP (Magyar Koalició Pártja). By the way, every time I see the abbreviation MKP I have to pause for a moment because that was the abbreviation of the Hungarian communist party right after the war (Magyar Kommunista Párt).  Pál Csáky, the new leader of this party of Hungarians within Slovakia, is farther to the right than its former chairman, Béla Bugár, a moderate, and there is the usual intraparty strife.

In any case, the meeting was held at the bridgehead of the Mária Valéria bridge, the only bridge built or rather rebuilt during Orbán's tenure. It is a skimpy little thing because money was tight. It was funded by the "Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Their Economies (PHARE) program created in 1989. Altogether there were about 12 million euros for the project, not exactly a large sum for bridge construction. It is very narrow (about 10 meters across) with only two lanes. However, Orbán kept repeating what a "fabulous place" this is where such a wonderful bridge could be built. A bridge was indeed badly needed across the Danube between Slovakia and Hungary, but this one has limited usefulness. For instance, 16-wheelers are not allowed on it; it's too narrow and, I suspect, it might collapse under their weight. So it doesn't further the transport of goods between the two countries.

Orbán in his speech talked a bit more about the European Union than he normally does in his campaign speeches for the EP elections, but by now one wishes that he had said even less. The lightning rod was his call for the Hungarian nation in "the Carpathian basin" to elect as many Hungarians to the European Parliament as possible. There will be the twenty-two Hungarians from Hungary, he mentioned four or five from "Erdélyország" (Transylvania), and two or three from "Felvidék" (the Uplands, the old name of the territory that Slovakia "occupies" today). One can listen to the speech in its entirety (it's about twenty minutes long) here: http://www.tv2.hu/Root/Tenyek/Videok/2009-05-23-orban_teljes_beszede_vagatlanul 

The reaction in Slovakia was swift and sharp. Prime Minister Robert Fico not unnaturally used the issue to his own advantage. He implored Slovaks to vote in the EU elections. Their mandate? To prevent the possibility that among the thirteen members Slovakia can send to the European Parliament four or five might be ethnic Hungarians who would actually be in the service of Hungary. The Slovak media, with the exception of some liberal papers, supported Fico. The Slovak prime minister gave a press conference in Kosice on May 25 in which he attacked Orbán and Csáky who talked in Esztergom about "the Carpathian basin as a fictitious territorial unit that should be represented by as many Hungarian delegates as possible." This "absurd" idea threatens the territorical integrity of Slovakia. Fico wanted to know what country the Hungarian delegates from Slovakia would represent: Slovakia or Hungary. Fico and other Slovak politicians called for diplomatic initiatives in response to this threat. Some members of the Slovak parliament demanded an extraordinary session of the Slovak parliament to discuss the matter. By yesterday the necessary fifty signatures were collected and tomorrow an extraordinary parliamentary session will convene whose only topic will be Orbán's alleged attack on Slovakia's territorial integrity.

In Hungary the consensus is that Slovakia overreacted. After all, Orbán is merely the leader of one of the opposition parties and he didn't really mean what the Slovaks accuse him of. Fidesz's reaction was predictable. Péter Szijjártó, chief spokesman of the party, called one of the Slovak politicians "a boor." Not exactly acceptable language in diplomacy.

Fico is exploiting the Hungarian issue, but Orbán gave him the opening. One might argue that Slovakia is overly sensitive. But they have been joined by the Czechs and the Germans. There was a meeting of the Czech, Slovak, and German foreign ministers in Prague. After a working breakfast this morning the Czech foreign minister, Jan Kohout, at a press conference said that the Czech Republic is also worried about Orbán's reference to the representation of Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin in the European Parliament. He said that they consider such ideas a destabilizing force in the region. He added that he had hoped that once the countries formerly part of Greater Hungary joined the European Union "these problems would fade into the background but realizes with growing concern that they are still with us." And as if that weren't enough, Franz-Walter Steinmeier, the German foreign minister who after his visit to Prague went to Budapest, announced in the Hungarian capital that Germany is also worried about Orbán's statements.

The new Hungarian foreign minister, Péter Balázs, procrastinated. He promised a government reaction only after the extraordinary session of the Slovak parliament tomorrow. However, he tried to minimize the problem by saying that "a politician of the opposition said something on his own." Sure, sure, but everybody expects this politician of the opposition to be the next prime minister of Hungary.

All in all, Orbán most likely will continue his unique style of foreign policy where he left off. Although he had an experienced and moderate foreign minister in the person of János Martonyi, it was mostly Orbán and his close friend Zsolt Németh, who served as Martonyi's undersecretary, who conducted the country's so-called foreign policy. HVG, the respectable weekly famous for its covers, captured the essence of Orbán's DIY (do-it-yourself) foreign policy. Viktor Orbán, a soccer player in Hungarian national colors, is kicking a very high ball while János Martonyi is trying to catch it with a tennis racket. The Slovak foreign minister, Miroslav Lajcák, said in Prague and I must agree with him: "From the mouth of the chairman of Fidesz one can hear sentences that are no longer acceptable in the Europe of the 21st century. I would like to call attention to the danger that such politics pose."

László Sólyom, the diplomat

According to many people László Sólyom's activities cause at least as much trouble abroad as at home, if not more. The president immediately after his election decided that on Hungarian national holidays he will visit Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. With this decision he killed two birds with one stone: not only does he present himself as the representative of the "whole" nation, but he also doesn't have to celebrate together with the prime minister whom he obviously loathes. These holiday trips are not official visits. He goes to Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and less frequently to Ukraine as a "private person." Of course, there is no such thing in his case as a private person, especially not this year when his original plans included the use of a military airplane!

The Hungarian president has very little political power. The post is more or less ceremonial. When it comes to foreign policy the president, at least on paper, is supposed to go where the government tells him to and his statements once there are severely circumscribed. However, Sólyom is a loose cannon and it seems to me that the Hungarian foreign ministry has absolutely no power over where he goes and what he says. In the end the ministry is left holding the bag.

Hungary's relations with its neighbors have worsened visibly thanks to Sólyom's "diplomatic" activities. It doesn't matter how often the foreign ministry's spokesman repeats, for example, that Romanian-Hungarian relations are just wonderful, it is clear that there are strains in that relationship. The sticking point is territorial autonomy for the Szeklers who reside in a fairly solid bloc in three counties: Harghita (Hargita), Covasna (Kovászna), and parts of Mures (Maros). The Szeklers are Hungarian-speaking people whose ethnic origin is the subject of debate, but they settled in these parts very early as warriors responsible for defending the country from eastern invaders.The call for territorial autonomy for the Szeklers is supported by the Hungarian president and to some extent, although less forcefully, by the Hungarian government. Romania is dead set against any kind of autonomy. The Romanians consider their country a "nation state." Hungarians constitute only 6.6% of the population, but that still translates into a sizable number--1,434,000, according to a recent census. Trajan Basescu who not long ago visited Budapest and paid a visit to the palace of his Hungarian counterpart told the Hungarian president in no uncertain terms that Romania will never agree to Hungarian autonomy in the Szekler inhabited counties.

The Slovaks are also worried about Sólyom's frequent visits because the Slovak government feels a great deal more threatened than the Romanian. While in Romania the three Szekler inhabited counties are in the middle of Transylvania, in Slovakia the Hungarians live in a fairly solid bloc all along the Slovak-Hungarian border. They constitute about 10% of the country's population. The Slovaks simply can't stop worrying about Hungary's intentions or at least about further Hungarian inroads into the southern regions of Slovakia due to the lack of a real traditional border between the two countries. The Slovaks pretty well told Sólyom that he wasn't welcome in Slovakia. Of course, this is not exactly  acceptable behavior from a country belonging to the same European Union as her neighbor but, let's face it, the Hungarian president's private visits with an official agenda is not comme il faut either.

This year, as in the last three, Sólyom was planning to spend the national holiday among Hungarians living outside the borders. This time in Serbia. It was going to be an extended visit. Three days visiting Hungarian centers and historical monuments in the area called Voivodina, part of Hungary until 1918. In 1970 Voivodina received wide ranging autonomy within Yugoslavia, not so much because of the Hungarian presence there since Hungarians make up only 14% of the province's population. But in 1990 Voivodina lost its autonomy under the presidency of Slobodan Milosevic. In the last few months the Serbian parliament has been debating the restoration of some kind of special status for the area. It was in the middle of a political fight over the region that Sólyom decided to tour the province. But suddenly, only a few days before his planned departure, the office of the president announced that plans had changed. Instead of spending three days there Sólyom will stay for only a few hours. The suspicion is that Belgrade put pressure on the Hungarian government to shorten the trip given the delicacy of the political situation over the issue of Voivodina. If that is the case, Sólyom seems to have obliged. By itself a miracle. The Hungarian president practically never changes his mind. It was now time for the Hungarian minority leaders in Voivodina to be sore. They announced that if the Hungarian president intends to spend so little time in Voivodina, it is better that he remains in Budapest. They don't accept "alms" from anybody.

So what now? It looked as if for the first time in his presidency Sólyom would have to remain put and celebrate together with the Hungarian government. But the folks in the presidential palace hatched a new plan: he will go to Romania on the 15th right after his official duties in front of the parliament building. He will fly in a military plane to Targu Mures (Marosvásárhely) and from there will go by car to a place known in Hungarian as Nyergestető (in Romanian Piatra Nierges) where he will remember a battle between the Hungarians and the joint forces of Austria and Russia that took place on August 1, 1849. Although the two hundred soldiers were overpowered by the enemy, they refused to surrender and all died there. The office of the president quickly penned an English-language request for permission to land the military plane. The author of the letter didn't know English too well, it seems. He translated the Hungarian word for local government "önkormányzat" as self-government (a mirror translation)--that is, in English means autonomy or self-rule. The Romanian government, citing this mistranslation, refused to grant a landing permit. I may venture to say that this was just an excuse. The Romanians are tired of Sólyom's visits and his constant harping on an autonomy that Romania refuses to grant. In the end Sólyom and his entourage had to travel by car. A sixteen-hour trip, and therefore the date had to be changed as well. He left early in the morning on March 14 and returned the same day. Thus, for the first time since his inauguration he spent the national holiday in Budapest and had to attend the gala performance that included Ferenc Gyurcsány's speech.

It may have been difficult to get there, but once he was in that military cemetery he again said a few inappropriate words. Let me quote: "People used say that Hungarians celebrate their defeats. This is not so: what we are celebrating here is that there are situations when we can no longer retreat. There are times when we have to put our backs against a rock or a pine tree and turn against our enemies." What can I say after that? Not much.

The Hungarian extreme right and the judiciary

How did we end up in this mess? I'm thinking of the situation in which small but vocal and active far-right groups can force the hand of the Hungarian government and are able to influence its foreign relations. Of course, it would be a simplification to state that everything has been fine between Slovakia and Hungary in the last fifteen years or so. No, there had been tensions before, but in the last two years things definitely got worse. In Slovakia the elections of 2006 brought into power a coalition in which two of the three coalition partners espouse nationalistic, anti-Hungarian rhetoric which they are now able to translate into action. Almost at the same time the Hungarian right-wing opposition party Fidesz began to employ in its attacks on Ferenc Gyurcsány the rabble, the football hooligans, groups that went out on several rampages against the government. At the same time extreme right organizations appeared on the scene--Jobbik, Sixty-Four Counties (the number of counties in Greater Hungary prior to 1918), as well as paramilitary units organized by these groups. The language Fidesz uses is the language of violence which inspires others to commit violent acts. These groups don't miss any opportunity to wreak havoc. Anniversaries of national holidays are the favorites, but they are good at creating days of remembrance for practically anything: the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, the anniversary of Gyurcsány's speech at Balatonőszöd, even the anniversary of the First Vienna Award.

It is hard to understand why the Hungarian government is unable to deal with these groups. I myself can occasionally mutter very angry words and complain about the "useless" government, the "ridiculous" police force. Yes, sometimes I'm totally frustrated.

One problem is that there is no united political resolve to deal with the extremists. Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, are masters of double-talk which encourages the extremists. If Fidesz doesn't unequivocally support the extremists, the party doesn't condemn them either. Or if they say something negative, they add: "but one can understand their frustration." After all, Orbán needs their votes. The extreme right is much larger than the few hundred people who are ready to go out on the street to demonstrate. According to one recent sociological study, those with extreme right-wing sentiments may be as high as 20% of the population though only 5% are ready to take part in demonstrations that may end in violence. The rest just watch and cheer their friends on. Moreover, on the local level Fidesz representatives often work hand in hand with representatives of Jobbik.

Another problem is the judiciary. Proceedings are extremely slow. It can easily happen that a rather simple case drags on for a decade. As I have often said, I'm absolutely unable to figure out the Hungarian system of appeals. I haven't seen so many opportunities for appeal in my life. One reads that the "final verdict" is such and such, but a week later some other appeal is being launched from some other quarter. I have given up ever learning the intricacies of Hungarian legal procedure. Then there is the quality of the judges. During the Kádár regime judges' prestige was very low. So was their remuneration. Judgeship became a female profession as often happens in badly paid professions with low prestige. Even today when judges are paid quite well some 60% of all judges are women. There are a lot of judges, but they still seem to be overburdened. I guess one problem is that unlike in the United States where one judge per courtroom suffices, in Hungary there is often a whole panel of judges. Then it  happens that one of the parties doesn't show up. New date, no show, and on it goes.

Ignorance of the law is not uncommon among the judges. People love to quote the former chief justice of the Supreme Court who, when asked about a badly mishandled case, indignantly replied that the judges don't have to leaf through the constitution all the time. That's not their job! According to some of the harsher critics of Hungarian judges, the higher up a judge is the more likely it is that he is totally unqualified. Another problem is that the political orientation of the judges is decidedly toward the right. Therefore, a right-extremist can rest assured that he won't receive much by way of punishment. A suspended sentence perhaps. But most often acquittal. Therefore these troublemakers are emboldened to continue. They know that nothing will happen to them. In the case involving the Hungarian Guard, the Guard pretty well ruled the court proceedings, stopped people from entering the courtroom, waved flags. The judge allowed all this. A month or so later there was another session but at that point the judge announced that she had received threats on her life and therefore she refused to continue with the case. New judge, new court date while the Guard is getting bigger and bigger.

And I haven't mentioned the Constitutional Court which consistently refuses to consider any change in the criminal code that would modify the very liberal interpretation of freedom of speech. Several attempts were made to introduce legislation against "hate speech," for example. Parliament passed bills and sent them on to László Sólyom, president of the republic. But Sólyom made it clear that he had doubts about the bills' constitutionality. He then sent the bills to the Constitutional Court. Once he raises doubts (and it's happened several times) one can be sure that the Constitutional Court will find the bill unconstitutional. After all, Sólyom used to be the chief justice of this court so if he thinks it's unconstitutional it must be so. Right now a new criminal code is in the making with much tougher sentences for certain crimes. We will see what happens. I'm not at all optimistic. The bill will pass, Sólyom will go to the Constitutional Court, and the judges will find it unconstitutional.

The only hope is the force of public opinion. But it surely would be easier if Fidesz openly and without reservation stood alongside the government in condemning these extremists. Alas, that is not in the party's interest at the moment.

Hungary and Georgia

Hungary's reaction to the Russian-Georgian conflict is in line with that of the European Union. Given Hungary's energy needs and its reliance on Russian gas and oil the country can't afford to lash out against Russia. Moreover, as a member of the European Union it would be improper for Hungary to deviate from Union policy. However, I'm certain that the Hungarian government is duly shaken by Russia's revival as a military power.

It's not surprising that after a period of chaos and humiliation Russia would eventually recover and claim what it considers to be its rightful place among the great powers. The speed of its recovery is more surprising. The commodity boom certainly helped.

One major thorn in Russia's side has been the encroachment of NATO into areas that were either within its sphere of influence or part of the Soviet Union itself. Bad enough that the former satellite countries joined NATO, worse that the Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union also signed on. But lately there have been serious talks about Georgia and Ukraine becoming part of the western military alliance.

Of course, we don't know exactly why Russia sent troops into Georgia. But I assume one incentive was the hope that the pro-western Georgian government would collapse. When it didn't, the Russians kept postponing troop withdrawal. Perhaps, the Russians may have reasoned, as days went by the Georgian government's position would weaken and there might be some voices in Tbilisi calling for the resignation of Shaakisvili in exchange for a better deal with the Russians. Every day one heard that the Russian troops began withdrawal only to learn the next day that nothing had happened.

In Hungary everything that has to do with foreign policy sooner or later becomes an internal political fight between the government and its opposition. The Georgian case is no different. First came Viktor Orbán's very strong reaction to the Russian-Georgian conflict where he compared the Russian attack on Georgia to 1956. (Since then some American politicians have repeated this comparison, adding the 1968 Prague events for good measure.) Orbán and diplomacy don't mix. When he was prime minister he often behaved like a bull in the china closet. For a number of years I kept a cover of HVG, a very good weekly, that portrayed Orbán as a soccer player kicking a football sky high while his ineffectual foreign minister was trying to stop it with a tennis racket.

In any case, the Russian ambassador's reaction to Orbán's strong condemnation was equally ill-tempered. Ambassador Igor Savolski called Orbán a liar and expressed his "disgust" at hearing Orbán's attack on Russia. He accused him of Russia phobia. Orbán wasn't deterred; yesterday he wrote a letter to the prime ministers of Georgia, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states in which he called Russia the aggressor and urged Georgia's acceptance into NATO. One can certainly argue about who was the aggressor and who wasn't, but it is somewhat odd that the leader of an opposition party who has no possible way of conducting the foreign policy of the country finds it appropriate to make such a move. Igor Savolski in response called Orbán an agent of the United States, adding that it is a good thing that the European Union doesn't follow Orbán's advice. Judging from the exchange between the Russian ambassador and Orbán it's not too hard to imagine how strained relations between Russia and Hungary would be under an Orbán-led government.

Meanwhile Mátyás Eörsi (SZDSZ) who reports to the European parliament on the region just returned from Georgia and saw no sign of any Russian withdrawal as of yesterday. Today Russian troops apparently withdrew from Gori. Somehow, I don't think that the Georgian-Russian conflict will end any time soon.

U.S.-Hungarian relations

Apparently ever since Hungary began successful negotiations with Russia concerning the Southern Stream, a new pipeline carrying natural gas through Turkey and the Balkans to Italy, Hungary, and Austria, the United States has been miffed with Ferenc Gyurcsány. Washington was worried, despite Hungary's protestation to the contrary, that Hungary's commitment to receive Russian natural gas through this new pipeline meant its abandonment of the Nabucco project of the European Union, still in the planning stage and strongly endorsed by the United States. Gyurcsány kept repeating that Hungary simply didn't want to rely on only one source of natural gas. Washington remained suspicious. The relationship between the two countries became somewhat strained.

Viktor Orbán immediately sensed an opening here. His own relations with Washington in the last few years had been cool, if not outright frigid. It all started with 9/11 when István Csurka, head of the right radical MIÉP, then still a party with representation in parliament, made a speech in which he pretty well announced that the United States got what it deserved. Orbán, although present when the offending speech was delivered, said nothing in response. One of the problems with Orbán is that he subjugates everything to domestic considerations, and at that time he needed MIÉP's votes. I'm sure he thought he could explain things away. He didn't know the president of the United States. Although he desperately tried to get an invitation to the White House in the spring of 2002 when receiving an honorary doctorate from Tufts University, George W. Bush had no time for him. Washington, in order to show that the problem was not Hungary but Viktor Orbán, invited both Orbán's successor, Péter Medgyessy, and Ferenc Gyurcsány to the White House. George W. Bush visited Budapest in the spring of 2006.

Fidesz and its media answered in kind: article after article appeared in Magyar Nemzet critical of U.S. policy especially concerning Israel and the Palestinian question. However, after Orbán sensed a cooling of U.S.-Hungarian relations he moved into high gear. He visited New York and Washington, had conversations with middle echelon leaders at the State Department, and courted the American ambassador, April H. Foley, and her predecessor, George H. Walker, first cousin of former president George H. Bush. His efforts bore fruit. George H. Walker apparently intervened on Orbán's behalf so he would be received by the older Bush. For one reason or another that trip didn't materialize but now, after the Southern Stream, things looked a bit brighter. An influential strategist from the Republican National Committee spent a week or so in Hungary giving lectures to Fidesz politicians about political strategy in general and tips on successful campaigning in particular. Then came the news that Orbán is going to the United States in late August to attend the Republican National Convention. This time, it seems, he will be the guest of former President Bush.

However, Gyurcsány is nobody's fool, and he knew he had to do something to show Washington that Hungary is still America's faithful ally and not a pawn of President/Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry organized a three-day trip to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the two countries whose cooperation is absolutely necessary to make the Nabucco pipeline a reality. Turkmenistan especially is a hard nut to crack and we still don't know what the final word is. One Hungarian paper gingerly described the attitude of Gurbanduly Berdimuhammedow, president of the country, as "he doesn't completely reject the idea of the transportation of the gas to Europe." That's not much, but I guess it's more than was expected. In any case, the encounter between the two men were interesting. Their first meeting lasted one and a half hours longer than scheduled and as a result several planned programs had to be cancelled. In their place, out of the blue the president invited Gyurcsány to a horse show followed by a dinner for two and a visiting to a bazaar. The result: the Hungarian delegation left Ashkadab, the Turkmen capital, four hours late. All told Berdimuhammedow and Gyurcsány spent six and a half hours together.

Apparently, Gyurcsány needed all his powers of persuasion, and at the beginning the negotiations didn't go at all well. It was at this point that the Hungarian prime minister came up with the idea of a Nabucco summit and invited the Turkman president to be part of it. That seemed to do the trick. Suddenly Berdimuhammedow was enthusiastic about such a summit and showed an eagerness to attend. Apparently, the summit will take place in Budapest.

And now comes Washington. Gábor Horváth, foreign correspondent of Népszabadság, had an interview with Matthew Bryza, undersecretary of the State Department in charge of Central Asia and questions of energy. During this interview Bryza said to Horváth that "in the name of my government I can officially express our satisfaction at the visit of the [Hungarian] prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. The United States strongly supports the summit and is pleased that Prime Minister Gyurcsány undertook such a trip." Bryza also praised Kinga Göncz, the foreign minister, who "was always very honest with us. We had serious negotiations and she always emphasized that Hungary was greatly interested in the project. With her own and the prime minister's trip to Central Asia all her promises have been fulfilled."

Just a word here about Kinga Göncz. She is the daughter of former President Árpád Göncz, and one is always a little bit suspicious about such appointments. She is a psychiatrist by training and I had never heard of her before she became minister of social welfare in the Medgyessy government, a role in which she didn't impress me. I couldn't figure out why Ferenc Gyurcsány asked her to be foreign minister. Yes, she does know languages and that is important. But otherwise? The Hungarian media were equally puzzled: the only thing they could figure was that with Hungary being part of the European Union the position of foreign minister was no longer very important. Moreover, they added, Gyurcsány is so active in foreign affairs that poor Kinga won't matter much.

I must say that I have had to change my mind about her. As minister of social welfare she was a boring goody-goody and, at least in my opinion, never said anything of interest. She smiled a lot and was pleasant. But otherwise? As they say, dull as dish water. Since she became foreign minister I changed my mind about her. I find her very diplomatic, well spoken, at ease, and someone who really knows her subject. There is a warmth and genuineness about her which I assume is refreshing in the diplomatic world. All in all, she appears to have been an excellent choice.