Hungarian Spectrum

Finding their way: The Hungarian socialists' dilemma

Ferenc Gyurcsány's answer to the problems of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was an adaptation of Tony Blair's "Third Way" so successfully employed as well by Bill Clinton and others. The "Third Way" is a term that has been used to describe a political position that attempts to transcend left-wing and right-wing politics. This approach is commonly viewed as representing a centrist compromise between capitalism and socialism, or between market liberalism and democratic socialism. But the Hungarian version of a centrist, reformist political orientation within the Hungarian Socialist Party failed. Ferenc Gyurcsány was unable to deliver, and today MSZP is in crisis. What happened and why? This is what the party leadership is now trying to figure out, but I'm not at all sure that they are on the right track. The catchword today is "return to the left." Everybody is talking about "leftist values," whatever they are.

Gyurcsány, who has not been seen or heard from since his "retirement," still has his blog except instead of writing every day as he used to he writes perhaps once a week. Mind you, his "fans" are still numerous. His last blog had over 800 comments! Usually he confines himself to everyday affairs--his knee operation, his children--but here and there he writes a few lines about politics. It is evident that he is sticking with most of his political ideas, which he still considers the foundation of a modern Hungarian society. It seems that Gyurcsány has also had enough of all this talk about "leftist values" and the accusation that where MSZP went wrong in the last seven years was the party's abandonment of leftist values. To quote Gyurcsány (June 30, 2009; http://kapcsolat.hu/blog/a_baloldalisagrol): "The question is not whether we were leftist enough in the last few years but instead whether there were times when we were too leftist." Here "being leftist" for Gyurcsány means giving too much to segments of society that are not active in producing economic growth. Children, students, the disabled, pensioners, and so on.

Those in the party who are considered to be the followers of Gyurcsány join the others in repeating the "toward the left" slogan, but they add that it also means "modernization." What modernization means in this context is also a mystery. Then there are the left-wingers. Katalin Szili and Tibor Szanyi are good examples. They want to help the lower classes and are less concerned with the middle class that is actually the backbone of the party's electorate. As Szili said this morning, she wants to work for a "plebeian mass party of the left." However, she immediately added that she doesn't want to have "a squandering state but one that develops." You will say: "but this doesn't make any sense." No, it doesn't. It doesn't because I have the feeling that Ms. Szili doesn't know what she is talking about. Both Szili and Szanyi say that they wholeheartedly support Gordon Bajnai's program because the country has no other choice. They are supporting the program of the man who just the other day made it crystal clear that "the number 3.8 is carved in stone." That is, the deficit cannot be higher than 3.8% and surely no "squandering" of public money is possible with that tight a budget. (I use the word "squandering" here because I couldn't find any better equivalent for the Hungarian "osztogató." I think this translation is fairly close.) And there's the rub. How can MSZP be the "plebeian mass party of the left," which presumably implies a very generous state, under the present circumstances?  I don't think it can be.

There are some who think that MSZP's problem is that it suffers from left-over Kádárism that prevented the full blossoming of the market economy. At the same time they continued the "insane spending" that kept the Kádár regime going for a while. As the matter of fact, practically all governments after 1990 added to the "insane spending" until the the country nearly went bankrupt. But the most recent crisis wasn't the first. In the latter part of the 1970s and the mid-1990s the country was on the brink of financial ruin as well. Both times stringent measures had to be adopted. But these measures were temporary. As soon as the country got out of financial trouble the government went back to its profligate ways. This is what they call in Hungary a policy of "loosening and tightening."

The socialists at the moment are busily apologizing for not being socialist enough. They practically admit, repeating the accusations of the opposition, that they did nothing and achieved nothing. This is, of course, not at all true. They try to explain their failure on a lack of communication. They say that they didn't "explain" the reforms properly. Some critics claim that in the middle of a financial crisis and the implementation of an austerity program the government simply shouldn't have initiated a reform program. A lot of criticism is levelled against the socialists' coalition partner, SZDSZ, because of their doctrinaire liberalism that led to the disastrous so-called health reform. Yes, health reform was handled poorly, but it wasn't a pivotal factor in the failure of the Gyurcsány government. The decline of the party began immediately after the announcement of the austerity program during the summer 2006 and has continued relentlessly ever since.

Ferenc Gyurcsány's problem was not that he was not leftist enough but that he wasn't courageous enough to make greater cuts in unnecessary social spending. To the very end he insisted on keeping the extra month of pension for 3.5 million pensioners, which was a huge budgetary burden. And when he first came out with his austerity program he said "one mustn't be afraid, it won't hurt." Well, of course, it was going to hurt. He should have been totally frank and told the whole truth. After all, it seems that Bajnai's stringent measures have been accepted and there are already tangible results that even the population has been noticing. Perhaps a less timid, less leftist approach would have been more successful than the one Gyurcsány chose. The question is whether the party leaders would have accepted such measures in the summer of 2006. They seem to accept them now but perhaps three years later, after a world economic crisis, they came to their senses. In any event, I cannot see a return to the good old socialist "plebeian mass party of the left" any time soon. The only way out is still Gyurcsány's way, without him for the time being.

Gordon Bajnai is the new Hungarian prime minister

Today was the day. The so-called "civic organizations," apparently all five hundred of them, organized a mass demonstration in front of parliament to demand immediate elections. They claimed to be the voice of the "people." I must say that if five hundred "civic organizations" managed to gather only 5,000-7,000 people that is not a great feat. The number of demonstrators seems about right. With few exceptions this is average number, perhaps a little more, for a mass demonstration. My problem is with the five hundred civic organizations. I didn't even know there were that many in Hungary. In addition to the human demonstrators there were also sixty geese who were let loose by members of the Hungarian Guard. This is the newest form of protest against Gordon Bajnai, whose firm at one point was involved with closing a company that was exporting chickens and geese to Russia. The market dried up and the company went bankrupt. Bajnai apparently had nothing to do with the affair, but such trivial considerations never bother the Hungarian right. So, besides dealing with the human demonstrators, the police tried to catch the sixty geese as well.

After a while the peaceful demonstration turned out to be not so peaceful because there are always people who join in order to create trouble. In addition, in far-right circles there are visible signs of hostility among the various splinter groups. The members of the "civic organizations," for example, turned their backs on Gábor Vona, head of Jobbik, when he rose to speak. Most of the civic people left peacefully enough, but the 200 or so Hungarian guardists attacked the police and at one point even tried to overturn an ambulance. In the scuffle three guardists were slightly injured. About 25 "Goy Bikers" also arrived; they were ready to drive straight into the police cordon. Several policemen were injured in the fracas while over ten demonstrators were arrested. The Goy Bikers led about 1,000 people to the Castle district to give President Sólyom a petition with the request that he dissolve parliament, thereby allowing for early elections. The only problem with this brilliant suggestion is that President Sólyom has no constitutional authority to oblige.

Meanwhile inside the building there was a three-hour debate preceding the vote on Gordon Bajnai's acceptance as the new prime minister of Hungary. The first speaker was Ferenc Gyurcsány who in an elegant and moving speech asked politicians on both sides of the aisle to support Bajnai in the interest of the country. Bajnai in a sober speech emphasized that he has no political ambitions and he will concentrate on solving the country's economic problems. Again, he asked for the support of the opposition parties as well. The answer was swift. Tibor Navracsics made it clear that no help can be expected from his party. It is unfortunate that Navracsics's speeches are normally no more than ad hominem attacks on his political opponents. Today's speech was no different--to the great delight of his colleagues in Fidesz. Károly Herényi, as an independent but formerly head of the MDF caucus, also made a speech in which he criticized Bajnai's program mostly because it is not yet apparent whether the new prime minister's plans include reforms or concentrate only on austerity measures. Gábor Fodor of SZDSZ, known for his polite ways, felt that he had to say something about the uncivilized behavior of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic leaders after the Navracsics speech. At least Viktor Orbán forbade the Fidesz members to cackle during Bajnai's speech. Because this was their plan! On the other hand, he was the only party leader who refused to shake hands with the new prime minister.

Ildikó Lendvai's urbane and eloquent speeches will be greatly missed. Every time she spoke it was a delight to listen to the well formulated phrases and appropriate literary references. She was witty and sometimes cutting but always fundamentally polite. She is a good speaker and a great debater. I'm afraid that Attila Mesterházy, her most likely successor, will not be able to fill her shoes. At least not verbally. He stumbled several times when misreading the text in front of him. The other side was gripped with fits of laughter. Let's hope he improves.

The vote was no surprise. In order for Bajnai to become prime minister, he needed 193 affirmative votes. He received 204 yeas and eight abstentions. MSZP unanimously supported the candidate while out of the nineteen-member SZDSZ caucus sixteen voted for him and three (Béki, Gulyás and Velkey) abstained, breaking party discipline. Fidesz, KDNP, and MDF members were present but didn't vote. After Gordon Bajnai was sworn in, Ferenc Gyurcsány rose from the customary chair of the prime minister and moved to the very last row, taking his place there as an ordinary backbencher. I have a very high opinion of Ferenc Gyurcsány's intelligence and political savvy, but listening to Gordon Bajnai's measured words and looking at his calm demeanor I think that perhaps his temperament is better suited to the turbulent times Hungary is witnessing. In any case, as soon as Bajnai was sworn in the Hungarian forint strengthened. At the moment one euro is worth 288 forints. Only a few days ago it was close to 310. All the ministers, the seven new ones and the eight old ones, will make their appearance in front of the various parliamentary committes. The procedure has already begun. After all, time is of the essence.

The Rise and Fall of Ferenc Gyurcsány, Part II

I think it's time to take a breather and write about something other than current Hungarian politics. For those who don't follow Hungarian events closely, let me recap the day's news: Gordon Bajnai received 93% of the votes at the MSZP Congress this morning. Ildikó Lendvai was voted in as chairman of the party with 92%. These figures might be the highest ever in the history of MSZP. As everybody says, when the party is in big trouble MSZP can show remarkable cohesion. Moreover, I have no doubt that Attila Mesterházy will be elected to head the parliamentary caucus. The National Council (Országos Tanács) of SZDSZ spent five hours contemplating the obvious, and eventually 66 to 21 they gave their blessing to Gordon Bajnai. And now comes the really difficult job: to stick to the program and support Gordon Bajnai.

Fans of Ferenc Gyurcsány, those who religiously read Gyurcsány's blog and some of whom ran with him in the morning on Margaret Island, waited outside the building wearing white T-shirts with red lettering: "Húzzunk bele!," a colloquialism roughly meaning "Let's go and work!" These were the words with which Gyurcsány finished his blogs. Flowers and kisses, and I'm sure that Gyurcsány was moved.

But he was always a popular guy. At college too in Pécs where he arrived in September 1980 after serving a year in the Hungarian army. He was a scrappy fellow even then because he managed to get a good job right away: he and a friend of his became "teachers" in the dormitory of a high school. They got free room and board in addition to a monthly salary of 800 Ft, not bad money in those days. Their only responsibility was to keep an eye on the kids at night. One of them had to be in the building between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. In addition, Gyurcsány had four or five students whom he tutored in biology. All in all, he was financially quite comfortable.

Not only was he popular; he also had perceived leadership ability. When he was asked whether he would run for office in KISZ (Kommunista Ifjúsági Szervezet) he said okay. Moreover, something that surprised everybody, he stuck with this organization until the bitter end. József Debreczeni quotes an interview of Eszter Rádai with Gyurcsány in Mozgó Világ (December 2003) http://www.mozgovilag.hu/2003/12/03radai.htm in which Eszter Rádai specifically asked Gyurcsány how it was possible that "such an intelligent, talented young man so enthusiastically and proudly organized his life around KISZ and didn't seem to notice that similarly intelligent young men found the whole 'movement' ridiculous?" Debreczeni shared Eszter Rádai's amazement. He himself in his third year of college gave up his membership in KISZ. That was in 1977 and by that time, according to Debreczeni, there were no political consequences of such a move. Debreczeni tried to find a way to reconcile his decision with Gyurcsány's. He did a lot of research in Pécs and interviewed many people who were there at the time.

The party leadership of Pécs was considered to be "liberal" in those days. Liberal not in the real sense of the word but in its Kádárist interpretation: less restrictive and oppressive than many other places in the country. The first secretary of the County of Baranya was a certain Dr. József Nagy who was a more cultured and thoughtful guy than the average apparatchik. (He became László Sólyom's father-in-law when Sólyom married Erzsébet Nagy, the party secretary's daughter.) Before 1982 there were two institutions of higher education in Pécs: the university where they taught law and economics and the teacher's college. In 1982 these two merged to become Janus Pannonius University, named after the Renaissance poet who was also bishop of Pécs. This new university was organized along western models and managed to get very good instructors. Perhaps one reason for allowing Pécs to test the limits of cultural and artistic freedom was György Aczél's earlier connections with the city.

So how did Gyurcsány end up becoming the KISZ secretary of the whole university and beyond? At the teacher's college he was initially in charge of organizing student volunteer work and job placement. According to his own account he was apolitical in those days. Politics was never discussed in the family and he never gave much thought to the political reality of the Kádár regime. He just took it for granted as the normal way of life. Obviously he must have been a good organizer because in the fall he was elected KISZ secretary of the college. He wasn't the only nominee. The rivals gave speeches to sway the "electorate." Even then he spoke well except that he talked too fast. According to some he had a speech defect: the end of words got swallowed. Whatever the alleged speech impediment, he won the election. Then came a "lucky break" for Gyurcsány. Because of the merger of the teacher's college with the university the responsibilities of the KISZ secretary multiplied, and the authorities decided that it should be a paid position. He would get 3,500 Ft a month. Would he take it? It was a tremendous amount of money. His mother made less. He even got an office, and he didn't have to go to classes. Just take exams. He was thrilled.

What did a KISZ secretary do in those days? Debreczeni talked to László Himmer who at that time was one of secretaries of the Baranya County KISZ. According to him, by that time the name of the organization was a misnomer. In reality it was an organization that busied itself with social programs: camps, quiz programs, organizing clubs, holding parties. They organized "university days" in which 15-20,000 students participated. Every year they held a mock election for president of the university. On the main square of the town 10,000 people listened to the election speeches. One year the nominee was Comrade Nobody and the university's KISZ plastered posters all over town with "Vote for Nobody." Trouble followed because it happened to coincide with the national "elections."

He was popular among the students but much less so in KISZ and party circles because he went outside the bounds of caution. He had constant differences of opinion with the party secretary of the university. After one of their "discussions" Gyurcsány found a quote from Friedrich Engels which said that the party should have control of an independent media because without outside criticism the party would not survive. He wrote a piece about the idea in the student paper. The party secretary accused him of "antidemocratic views."

But the real trouble came later. The students of the Institute of Aesthetics and Arts organized a post-modern exhibition, and among the works were some that were not exactly politically correct: for example a broken globe next to a red vacuum cleaner. Gyurcsány tried to save the students and with the help of one of the associate deans managed to keep a lid on the affair.  However, the university's MSZMP leadership was furious and made Gyurcsány personally responsible. After all, the exhibition was under the aegis of KISZ.

So, all in all, in Debreczeni's words, Gyurcsány's role as a paid KISZ secretary was not really political. The whole organization by that time had lost its political character. I might add that the financial independence that the KISZ secretary position gave him was most likely paramount in his decision to accept the job. He no longer had to rely on his poor mother. On the contrary, he sent money home to help her and her sister out.

Road to Gyurcsány's resignation

Today, while we await Bajnai's announcement of his economic plans (allegedly tomorrow), I would like to summarize a news report about "the background of the fall of Ferenc Gyurcsány" that appeared in the internet newspaper Origo yesterday. As opposed to many other "background studies" this one sounds genuine enough. I myself heard from reliable sources about certain events leading to the resignation announcement that jibe with the story that appeared in Origo. For example, the very first sentence of the piece, "Ferenc Gyurcsány has been thinking about leaving his post ever since December." This is exactly what I heard about a week ago.

According to Origo although he and his closest advisors and friends talked about the possibility of such a move, Gyurcsány kept his final decision to himself. The MSZP Congress was held on March 21. The night before he called his trusted entourage together and announced in "six sentences" his decision to resign, invoking the constructive no confidence option. After the announcement he read the speech he had prepared for the next day. Apparently some of his friends wept, but the announcement wasn't unexpected.

The idea of resignation was often discussed at informal meetings of Gyurcsány and his advisors. Most of the time these meetings took place in the family's residence and were also attended by J. Zoltán Gál, Gyurcsány's former chief-of-staff, and Viktor Szigetvári, director of the 2006 campaign. Sometimes Klára Dobrev, his wife, was also in attendance. After the budget was accepted in mid-December this group began to contemplate different strategies--from broadening public support to possible resignation. At this point Gyurcsány was in an optimistic mood and believed that he could stop the declining popularity of the party and himself. From mid-December on he talked about a new "reform program" that would be more intensive than former attempts. He hoped that the "reform package" the ministry of finance prepared and he was to present to parliament on the first day of the spring session (on February 16) would be well received. He himself put quite a bit of work into the program. Because of Gyurcsány's optimistic frame of mind and the feverish work on the economic reform package, the possibility of a change of prime ministers was put on ice for a while. Also, according to one of the informants of Orego, the staff didn't think that the time was propitious for offering the constructive no confidence option because they doubted that before the EP elections either MDF nor SZDSZ would be willing to support such a move. After all, it was in the interest of these two parties to show themselves as independent. Also there were people in Gyurcsány's entourage who thought that Gyurcsány is at his best when in a crisis situation, that he would emerge from this crisis with flying colors.

Gyurcsány's speech on February 16 was not flashy and, according to many people, was too long. He went point by point outlining the program although he did get a bit carried away when he described the rather modest austerity program as "the third great reform program of the last twenty years." The commentators initially greeted the program positively. A step in the right direction, they said. Moreover, as Gyurcsány himself said in an interview with Origo, after all there is no other program. Either this or nothing. However, the honeymoon was brief. On February 21 the Reform Alliance came out with its own program that was greeted enthusiastically by most economists. Moreover, MDF and SZDSZ decided to support this program instead that of the government. The votes of these two parties were necessary to pass Gyurcsány's program. It became clear that hopes pinned on the government's program were misplaced. "We noticed," said one of the informants, "that such an aura developed around the government and the person of the prime minister that it didn't matter how good our suggestions were, the newspapermen, the economists, the financial analysts automatically rejected them." And no matter what they did the prime minister's image didn't improve; his popularity only declined.

Gyurcsány is well known for his fortitude, but all these misfortunes began to take their toll. He worked too hard and started to look tired and uptight. He made statements that were confusing if not outright misleading. Two weeks after his program became public, out of the blue Gyurcsány announced that actually "more decisive and deeper changes are necessary." His program didn't seem to satisfy anyone. The employees thought it was too much while the employers thought it was too little. Meanwhile economic predictions darkened.

It was under these circumstances that Gyurcsány got together for a longer discussion. The weekend meeting began on Friday, March 13, and ended on Saturday. There were about 12-14 people present-- Gyurcsány's old friends and present colleagues. The meeting took place somewhere outside Budapest though we don't know the name of the town. Gyurcsány joined them only on March 14 and he listened to the two different strategies outlined. One of them was his conditional resignation through the constructive no confidence vote. We don't know what the other scenario was, but most likely something that would have ensured his survival. The people present were afraid that Gyurcsány might think they were urging him to leave. But after he read the prepared material, he said: "Yes, I understand." He also assured them that "he didn't think that we want to betray him." Apparently he said that he thought all this through at least a thousand times and before his final decision he would go over all the pros and cons again.

Gyurcsány allegedly informed his chief-of-staff, Ádán Ficsor, who was supposed to look into the legal side of things and make sure that the transition would be smooth. That was on Monday, March 16. Besides Ficsor, only his wife knew about his plans. During the week nothing indicated that Gyurcsány was planning to make a dramatic announcement. On Monday and Tuesday he was present at the parliamentary session but didn't speak. On Wednesday he travelled to Frankfurt where he talked with financial analysts and investors. From there he went to Brussels to the European Union summit. Most likely it was here that he wrote his "resignation" speech. After they left the meeting he retired to his hotel room where he most likely worked on the speech into the wee hours. At least he looked very tired the next morning. On Friday afternoon Gyurcsány arrived in Budapest where his friends and confidants got together in the Gyurcsány house and at this meeting nobody urged him to remain in his post. He delivered his valedictory speech to the party congress the next day.

What we know about the current Hungarian situation

In a way I would prefer to continue my short biography of Ferenc Gyurcsány. But I have the feeling that my readers would prefer to hear about current events and short-term predictions rather than the 1980s and Gyurcsány's student years in Pécs. (I'll return to that on a slow news day.)

I'm trying to avoid passing along every rumor that reaches the ears of a third-rate reporter and then is sold as hot news. Most of these stories sound unlikely if not outright unbelievable. The reporters also seem to have a penchant for trying to create panic by outlining scenarios that all predict the certain failure of a smooth transition from Gyurcsány to Bajnai. Both SZDSZ and MSZP are fractured (true enough), so there won't be the necessary votes for Bajnai to become prime minister of Hungary (wrong). The problem with this scenario is that we know the exact number of SZDSZ members who voted against Bajnai. I reported on that yesterday. We also know that out of about 120 members of the MSZP caucus present at the Sunday meeting only four abstained and one didn't vote. Even without the members of MDF who, by all indications, will support the constructive vote of no confidence Bajnai should be fine. So what's the problem? One has the feeling that Hungarian journalists love chaos and trouble. Then perhaps they can write more riveting articles about the impending doom.

Since I'm not trying to sell papers or write episodes of The Perils of Pauline, let me outline briefly the pieces of information that seem credible. (1) Ferenc Gyurcsány decided to resign as party leader when it became obvious that the candidate for the post of prime minister would come from the inside. Two names were mentioned, the first a member of MSZP and the second politically unaffiliated--József Gráf, minister of agriculture, and Gordon Bajnai. If Gráf were to become the candidate Gyurcsány would resign because in his opinion the posts of prime minister and head of the party should be held by the same socialist politician. In Bajnai's case he would resign because they are close friends; if he remained the leader of the party it would look as if he were the puppetmaster and the new prime minister the puppet. (2) Currently there are two serious contenders for the post of chairman of MSZP: Ildikó Lendvai and Péter Kiss. But the field keeps widening. Imre Szekeres, minister of defense, is another frequently mentioned possibility. Kiss says he would accept the nomination but suggests Lendvai. Lendvai says that she would rather stay on as head of the MSZP parliamentary delegation. She claims that she is no good at administration. Next Sunday the nominating congress will have to make its decision. (3) For me the most interesting piece of news today was János Veres's revelation that Bajnai's austerity program is practically the same as the one he and his ministry worked out at the end of January and suggested for immediate acceptance. At that point he didn't get the nod from either the cabinet or the parliamentary caucus. In fact, Veres claims that he had already outlined his plan last summer at an MSZP retreat at Dobogókő. Not only did his plan get rejected only to resurface with a new advocate heading a new government, but it seems almost certain that he will be replaced as minister of finance. A new government, an old/new economic plan, a new minister of finance. (4) According to information the media received (which might just be part of the rumor mill) Bajnai is already talking about personnel changes in the cabinet; at least five people will be leaving.

And finally. What will Ferenc Gyurcsány do once he's no longer prime minister and head of the party? He made it clear that he is committed to continuing his political career. Although he said that he will remain a member of parliament, surely being an ordinary back bencher is not exactly Gyurcsány's style. One conceivable scenario was that if Ildikó Lendvai becomes chairman of the party then Gyurcsány could head the caucus. But no. Gyurcsány rejected that as well. He did, however, mention a position he would like to occupy: heading the Táncsics Mihály Alapítvány, the theoretical think tank of the socialist party. Here I'm speculating, but let me suggest what Gyurcsány has in mind. He is planning to work on making MSZP a truly social democratic party that would meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. A party of which he would be the logical head.

The rise and fall of Ferenc Gyurcsány, Part I

His rise was rapid and the fall even swifter. Not only did he propose that he be replaced as prime minister but, despite an 85% vote of confidence from the party, he resigned as head of MSZP. Whether this is only a temporary fall we don't know yet. After all, there are many famous politicians who failed only to rise again like a phoenix from the ashes.

In this installment I trace Gyurcsány's background and his early life, looking for clues to his fall. I am indebted to József Debreczeni's Az új miniszterelnök (Budapest: Osiris, 2006). Debreczeni, originally an MDF member of parliament and a great admirer of the conservative József Antall about whom he also wrote a book, became very fond of Gyurcsány during their long hours of conversation. In fact, in the last two or three years Debreczeni hasn't hidden his admiration for the "new prime minister." Debreczeni considers only three Hungarian politicians in the last twenty years to be of real significance: Antall, Orbán, and Gyurcsány. He continues to admire Antall and Gyurcsány but came to despise Orbán whom by now considers a dangerous populist who may lead the country into dangerous waters.

Gyurcsány's family background was modest. Neither his father nor his mother even went to high school. The mother worked as a textile worker all her life. The father was a truck driver who disappeared off and on. Mostly off. At one point he might even have been in jail. Ferenc knows little about his paternal heritage, but it seems that his Gyurcsány grandfather, Géza, whom he actually resembles, was an official in the internal revenue service. From the picture in Debreczeni's book Géza and his wife look like respectable middle class folks. Géza Gyurcsány's ancestors were typical gentry types from somewhere in the north of the country, today's Slovakia. Grandfather Géza seems to have adopted typical Hungarian gentry pastimes, like gambling. Apparently he managed to amass so much debt that he saw no way out and committed suicide sometime in the second half of the 1930s. His wife Mária died a year or so later. The young boy, also called Ferenc, was brought up by "relatives." Actually, maybe yes, maybe no. His son, our Ferenc, is not at all sure. Perhaps he was brought up by foster parents in a small town.

Gyurcsány's mother, Katalin Varga, came from a dirt poor family with eight children from the town of Pápa. Katus (as even her son calls her) didn't even finish eight grades, and sometime in the middle of the 1950s she got a job as an unskilled laborer at a factory in the city of Győr. It is here that Ferenc senior met her at a dance. Both were twenty-three at the time. They got married and eventually went back to the birthplace of Katus, Pápa. Soon enough there were two children--Éva and Ferenc. The family lived in "deep poverty," as Gyurcsány said. The four of them lived in a two-room apartment without a bathroom or even a toilet. The adults slept in the "living" room, Ferenc and his sister in the kitchen. There was one Christmas when there wasn't even money for a tree. Apparently, the cause of this poverty was Ferenc senior who drank heavily. When he ran out of money he borrowed to tide the family over, but often he didn't repay his debts. In job after job he was either fired or he quit. After a while everybody knew him in Pápa and no one would hire him, so he had to seek employment in Budapest where he lived in workers' hostels. Sometimes he would disappear for years on end, which was actually a blessing because Katus was very good with the money they had and there was no husband to drink it away. When one looks at Gyurcsány it is hard to imagine him growing up in such circumstances. He has an aristocratic look and elegance about him. He knows how to behave and finds himself at home in every new situation. There is a certain ease about him.

Young Ferenc excelled at school with little effort in spite of the fact that he didn't get any encouragement at home. There was not one book in the house, and Gyurcsány doesn't recall reading anything as a child other than the compulsory school assignments. And that wasn't much. His teachers remember him as a well behaved child, never any trouble. But even then it was clear that he was ambitious. He wanted to do well. Most likely because of his lack of reading Gyurcsány's favorite subjects were mathematics, physics, and chemistry. He was also a good debater and showed leadership qualities. He had a homeroom teacher who also taught him mathematics. This teacher noticed an announcement for a competition for one of the best high schools in the country, the Apáczai Csere János Gimnázium, a school attached to the university (ELTE) where the future teachers could learn their trade. (I once visited this high school watching a Hungarian literature class and I must say that the children had a better grasp of poetry analysis than most of us college students.) The applicants had to come from poor, working class families. He applied and was accepted. He received a scholarship and could live in the kollégium attached to the school.

The boarding school (kollégium) was a tough place. It was established in 1970 with the purpose of trying to bring very talented boys and girls from disadvantaged backgrounds up to the level of the sophisticated children of the Budapest intellectual elite who attended the school. It was not an easy job, but it seems that the teachers responsible for the well being of the children living in the kollégium succeeded. Although it was very difficult to get top grades at this school, the grade point average of the youngsters from the countryside was up to snuff. Life in the dormitory was very regimented. Students got up at six, exercised, ate breakfast, and walked over to the school that was attached to the dormitory. There were classes in the morning followed by lunch. Practically the entire afternoon was spent studying. Students watched the evening news on television after which they had a couple of hours of free time until lights out. One would have thought that the very active Gyurcsány would have found this regimented existence close to unbearable. But no, he adapted quickly and with relative ease.

Gyurcsány's only complaint was that, although he studied hard, he didn't receive one A in the first semester. All his grades were monotonous Bs. The young man wasn't accustomed to this and he decided to work harder and see what happens. He got up at four o'clock every morning and sat in the corridor and studied. By the end of the second semester he had four A's. By the end of grade 10 his grade point average was 4.5 which, according to the current principal of the school, was no mean achievement.

And here comes the first inexplicable break in the young Gyurcsány's life. This youngster who was so adaptive, who until then had never had any any serious conflict in school, in a huff puff quit the elite boarding school where he was liked and where he was academically successful. What happened was the following. Russian was compulsory for all four years, but students had to take a second language for at least the first two years. Gyurcsány took French but he didn't like it. By his own admission, he doesn't have a talent for learning languages. Anyway, after two years he decided to drop French. The kollégium, however, had a rule superseding the school's language requirement. If you were a student of the kollégium you had to carry on with both languages for four years. Gyurcsány had a little chat with the principal of the boarding school. Neither gave in. The four-year rule was applicable to students living in the dormitory, said the principal. Gyurcsány couldn't understand why he was held to a higher standard than other students in the school just because he happened to live in the kollégium. Gyurcsány quit and went back to the high school in Pápa. This was the first and unfortunately not the last time that the future prime minister behaved on impulse.

The high school in Pápa was not of the quality of the famous Apáczai, but it was a good school. Out of the thirty-eight students matriculating only two failed to go to college--and this at a time when college enrollment was very low. But in Pápa Gyurcsány didn't have to do any work to get the same grades as in Budapest. And he lowered his academic expectations. During the summer after his junior year he had a job as a bus conductor. There he got into a conversation with a passenger, a young woman who turned out to be a student at the Teacher's College in Pécs. Her major was biology and she reported that she had to take entrance exams only in physics and biology. Because Gyurcsány was good in science and because the entrance exam requirements were relatively low at the Teacher's College, he decided that Pécs would do. He was accepted, in spite of the devastating "recommendation" of his Hungarian teacher that followed his application.

The conflict with this particular teacher began innocently enough. In the Kádár regime every school had to organize a quiz program called "Who knows the most about the Soviet Union." Therefore each class had to subscribe to a magazine called "Szovjetúnió" because the quiz show questions were based on information from this magazine. The kids in the class were supposed to chip in to pay for the subscription. Everybody paid up with the exception of Gyurcsány. Not because of political reasons. He was just forgetful and didn't really care. When the Hungarian teacher, who was also in charge of the class, inquired where the money was and when it turned out that the account was still short because of Gyurcsány's tardiness, the teacher lectured him about the compulsory nature of this subscription. Gyurcsány indignantly announced that the school authorities could only ask the students to contribute, not demand that they contribute. An exchange of words ensued. Sharper and sharper. Not only did the teacher say nasty things to the student but the student responded in kind. The description of this dialogue followed him to college.

So this was the second time that Gyurcsány lost his cool. He wasn't the rebellious type in general but there were situations where he took a position and defended it to the death. His life in Pápa ended. The following September he went to Pécs to begin his career as a future teacher of biology.

 

Political chaos in Hungary

I wasn't sure whether I should write anything today because I can't make heads or tails out of what's going on in Hungary. Surányi says he doesn't want the job. So more scrambling. One wakes up to the name of János Takács as the newest MSZP suggestion for prime minister. I had never heard of him. He turned out to be the CEO of Electrolux Hungary. His name surfaced only to be dropped within a couple of hours: SZDSZ wants no part of János Takács. SZDSZ, although earlier its leaders emphasized that MSZP should nominate while they would simply nod or not nod, decided to come out with its own candidate, earlier the MDF candidate: Lajos Bokros.

Bokros at the beginning seemed eager enough and expressed his willingness to serve. At least that is what the Hungarian media reported. However, today the situation seems to have changed. Now Bokros says that he is not going to be part of the political machinations of MSZP. That can mean only one thing: he wants the support of the "opposition" parties: Fidesz, SZDSZ, and MDF. Well, if this is true Bokros will not be prime minister because in Orbán's opinion Hungary's future prime minister can  only be Viktor Orbán, preferably after early elections. The new spokesman of MDF, Szabolcs Kerék-Bárczy, behaved rather oddly today when Olga Kálmán inquired whether if MSZP supported Bokros's candidacy MDF would lend its name to a three-party political alliance behind its own favorite candidate, Lajos Bokros. Kerék-Bárczy refused to answer, saying that the very supposition is totally absurd. I guess that MDF is so afraid that anyone might associate the party with the left that its spokesman refuses to answer even a hypothetical question.

At the moment SZDSZ is sticking with Bokros although there are some voices (currently a minority) in the SZDSZ caucus who would be willing to support one of the MSZP suggestions. According to the latest rumors half of the MSZP nominating committee is ready to accept Bokros but the other half is dead set against him. They will meet again tomorrow morning. However, it might be irrelevant how Gyurcsány, Lendvai, and some of the others decide. The party's left wing is gathering strength: they have had enough of the "circus" of the whole nominating process and are planning to overthrow Ferenc Gyurcsány. According to Tamás Suchman, one of the heavyweights in this group, because Gyurcsány already announced his intention to resign he shouldn't be conducting the negotiations about his successor. Instead his deputy, the minister in charge of the prime minister's office, Péter Kiss, should assume his place at the negotiating table. Moreover, Suchman continued, he is going to make a motion to convene an extraordinary congress to elect a new party chairman. A left-wing putsch against Gyurcsány is brewing. Katalin Szili, Gyurcsány's rival in the party and the head of its left wing, somewhat more obliquely spoke of the party's duty to stop the "drift of the country" and urged that the party should take "political responsibility." I guess that means that Szili, Suchman, and others are ready to get rid of Gyurcsány both as prime minister and party chief and alone shoulder the responsibility of governing. But how?

Given the intra-party revolt, MSZP and SZDSZ should move quickly to decide on a mutually satisfactory  candidate. A rational human being would think that the survival instinct of these two parties would kick in and dictate cooperation. However, we are in Eastern Europe. In fact, very close to an area called the Balkans. In that area rational political thinking doesn't always have the upper hand. Cooperation? They don't know the meaning of the word. Western businessmen often complain that Hungarians are not good at team work. They are not joking! These two parties should have learned a lesson from the fiasco four years ago; because of their refusal to cooperate, although they had a majority in parliament, the country ended up with László Sólyom as president. The same left wing of MSZP was certain that their candidate, Katalin Szili, would win despite SZDSZ's refusal to support her. Well, it didn't work out that way. Both parties were at fault then and both are behaving the same way now.

I consider Gyurcsány a talented politician, but at the moment he is in a very difficult situation. The candidate both parties supported wouldn't accept the job. So now names come, names go, and tempers flare. His party's left wing wants to unseat him and undermine him at every turn. Meanwhile Viktor Orbán calls any prospective candidate a "clown" (paprikajancsi in Hungarian) because a "serious" candidate simply wouldn't take the job. Meanwhile the Hungarian Guard is planning to blockade roads to force early elections.

I'm downbeat today and I recall "Gloomy Sunday," the Hungarian "suicide anthem." Why would political parties in effect commit suicide? According to the Hungarian psychiatrist Bela Buda, Hungarians regard suicide differently from most other people. "In the unconscious popular mind suicide is a positive pattern of problem solution, it's a formula which is actualised in times of crisis because everybody has experiences with other persons who committed suicide and who were regarded not as failures but as brave people daring to restore their self-esteem and dignity by this desperate and heroic act." Is it heroic to turn over the reins of government to Fidesz?  I think not. So MSZP and SZDSZ had best come up with another solution to the problem of national governance.

The day after: total confusion in Hungarian political life

Ferenc Gyurcsány's announcement that in two weeks he is going to initiate a constructive vote of no confidence was a bolt of lightning from a clear blue sky. No one expected it. Of course, there are "clever people" who claim that they had suspected something like it for quite a while, but the truth is that although there were rumors that people on the left within MSZP were unhappy with the prime minister there was nothing new in that. These people have been unhappy for the last five years or so. Yes, it is true that the popularity of the party was at an all-time low, but the opponents of Gyurcsány within the party weren't strong enough to dethrone him. No one thought that the prime minister himself would come up with such an ingenious solution: calling a constructive vote of no confidence against himself. The only case where such a solution was invoked was Willy Brandt's resignation in May 1974 when a close associate of the chancellor and SPD president, Günter Gauillaume, turned out to be an agent of the East German Stasi. At that time Brandt and Herbert Wehner, a key man in the socialist party, figured out a way to have a new head of government without new elections: to initiate a constructive vote of no confidence in favor of Helmut Schmidt, minister of finance in the SPD-FDP coalition government.

Fidesz was obviously caught by surprise. The top brass, after spending hours pondering the situation, came up with the same old plan: new elections. On Monday they will initiate a motion to discuss the dissolution of parliament. As we know, such attempts have been made several times and they all failed for the simple reason that the opposition parties can't agree on such a plan of action. I'm almost certain that they themselves know that their motion will fail again, but since they have no intention of sitting down and talking to MSZP, Gyurcsány or no Gyurcsány, they have to come up with a plan of their own. As for the other parties, SZDSZ is considered to be the most willing to come up with a "government of experts." If one can believe Gábor Fodor, the head of the party, they are not thinking in terms of a coalition; in my opinion this might change. This morning Károly Herényi was fairly negative when asked whether MDF would negotiate with MSZP and SZDSZ. Instead he kept emphasizing that they would support the politicians of Fidesz in their quest for early elections. However, by this afternoon MDF changed its mind. They are willing to negotiate. Everything can turn on a dime these days in Hungary.

This morning the "presidium" of MSZP (president, vice presidents, and head of the parliamentary caucus) held a meeting after which Gyurcsány gave a press conference. According to him, MSZP would like to see an "open, national government whose aim is to make decisisions that would help the recovery of the country's economy." What does "national government" mean? I don't think that it means a grand coalition because Fidesz would never take part in such a coalition. Moreover, the way Gyurcsány formulated the presidium's position, it was clear to me that  a "national government" for the MSZP presidium simply means a government with a "comfortable majority." He added that they would like to see "wide support"--presumably, a common platform of the three parties: MSZP, SZDSZ, and MDF. Of course, Gyurcsány spoke as if they were also counting on negotiations with Fidesz, but surely he knows as well as almost everybody in the country that such negotiations will not take place. Not even if Tibor Szanyi, the self-appointed leader of the left within MSZP, announced today that a grand coalition should be formed "without Gyurcsány and without Orbán." Orbán would have to promise that he wouldn't seek the position of prime minister for at least a year! I can already see how eagerly Orbán would accept Szanyi's more than naive proposal. Gyurcsány in his speech yesterday clearly had Szanyi and some of his friends in the party in mind when he warned against "left-wing populism" that is no better than its right-wing variety.

As for the time table, according to plans MSZP (and whoever joins them, I guess) would put forth the motion of constructive no confidence on April 6 and parliament could vote on the motion on April 14. Gyurcsány stated that the new government should have a more far-reaching economic program than the one he and his government originally contemplated. The current government will do everything necessary to prepare the foundation of such a program, but it will be the duty of the new prime minister to decide to what extent he wants to follow the recommendations. Gyurcsány will try to be helpful. He said that the new prime minister should decide the composition of his cabinet, which led me to believe that the cabinet might include people from the other parties. He was also optimistic that the parties (without Fidesz in my opinion) will be able to agree on a suitable person for the job.

So who might the next prime minister be? It is almost certain that it will not be one of the MSZP bigwigs or members of the current government. Therefore we can discard some names currently circulating: Gordon Bajnai, József Gráf, Péter Kiss. It will most likely be an outsider whose background is in economics and/or finance. Lajos Bokros is unlikely because MSZP would not support his nomination and I doubt that SZDSZ would either. After all, SZDSZ thought that Bokros was their man and now he is heading MDF's European Parliamentary list. László Békesi says such awful things both about MSZP and Ferenc Gyurcsány that I very much doubt that MSZP would pick him. I wouldn't either, because I find his utterances undiplomatic if not outright rude. Like a bull in the china shop. Then there is András Simor, the current head of the Hungarian National Bank. His decisions in the last few months have not exactly shown him to be a capable future leader of a country in the middle of an economic crisis. Moreover, I found his constant blabbing outright injurious to the country's interests. That leaves György Surányi, central bank president between 1990-91 and 1995-2001. He was a very good bank president and during one of the years in office he was chosen as bank president of the year in Europe. The problem with Surányi is that he hasn't said much until now about how he would try to solve the current economic problems. But perhaps that might be his strength! In any case, my feeling is that among the experts he would be the most acceptable to the three parties that might be called upon to decide on the person of the prime minister. Here is a "family portrait" of those whose names are circulating as possibilities:   

Meanwhile, I'm just hoping that those people, followers of Fidesz, who are bent on having early elections will not cause any disturbances. The trade unions promised a huge demonstration for April 4 and one can only hope that those who see this whole constructive motion of no confidence as no more than a trick to keep MSZP in power will not join in. Or perhaps the leaders of the trade unions will have enough sense to scrap their march under the circumstances. That's all the country would need. Meanwhile, one newspaper is sure that because of Gyurcsány's resignation the forint will be even weaker on Monday while others predict that the market will soar upon hearing the good news. Rumors are floating every which way and it is difficult to keep up with the flow of information. One can write this blog in the morning and by evening the situation is entirely different. If everything works out well, I am hopeful that the political situation will be better than it is now. If Gyurcsány can concentrate on party matters and the coming EP elections, perhaps the outcome will not be an MSZP rout. With a comfortable majority the work of parliament will be smoother and more predictable. And finally an "expert" prime minister three parties can support will be able to make bolder moves in economic matters.

A bombshell: Gyurcsány offers his resignation but not yet

This must have been the best kept secret in Hungarian politics of the last twenty years! Ferenc Gyurcsány in his keynote address to the delegates of the MSZP Congress, after outlining the accomplishments of his government, said: “I hear that I am the obstacle to the cooperation required for changes, for a stable governing majority and the responsible behavior of the opposition. If so, then I am removing this obstacle now. I propose that we form a new government under a new prime minister.” What does this mean exactly? In order to understand the exact constitutional situation I must say a few words about the "constructive vote of no confidence." This parliamentary rule originated in Germany during the period of the Weimar Republic when one chancellor after the other was voted out of office as a result of a "motion of no confidence." It was therefore decided that parliament can vote the chancellor out of office only if there is a positive majority for a prospective successor. Today besides Germany such a "constructive vote of no confidence" exists in Spain and in Hungary.

According to Article 39A(1) of the Hungarian Constitution: "A motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister may be initiated by a written petition, which includes the nomination of a candidate for the office of Prime Minister, by no less than one-fifth of the Members of the National Assembly. A motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister is considered a motion of no-confidence in the Government as well. Should, on the basis of this motion, the majority of the Members of the National Assembly withdraw their confidence, then the candidate nominated for Prime Minister in the motion shall be considered to have been elected." Gyurcsány gave two weeks for the parties to come up with a common candidate.

And there's the rub. It is unlikely that any of the MSZP party leaders is suitable for the job: one is more colorless than the next. Moreover, if Gyurcsány's idea is to save his party by having someone else take the odium of the severe austerity package that must be introduced, the new prime minister shouldn't be from MSZP. That would not help the sagging MSZP popularity. In fact, it would only make it worse. One person who is eager to accept the position is Lajos Bokros. As you may remember, his name was already floated as a possible candidate for a constructive vote of no confidence by Ibolya Dávid, president of MDF. Neither MSZP nor Fidesz would support him. Out of the question, we were told. Bokros's skin must be quite thick because just this afternoon he announced that he is ready to join the socialists at their congress and, I guess, talk things over with the party heavyweights. However, Ildikó Lendvai, head of the MSZP caucus, announced in advance of his appearance that Bokros was unacceptable.

Fidesz and the party's hangers-on, the Christian Democrats, don't want to hear about any constructive vote of no confidence. They want early elections. Perhaps in June in conjunction with the European Union parliamentary elections. But outside of Fidesz and the Christian Democrats (who surely would not enter the fray as a separate party) no one wants to have early elections. To tell you the truth, I don't think that even Fidesz wants them. If I were Viktor Orbán, I wouldn't. Sure, he would win easily, but then what? All his empty promises would be exposed. Instead of a horn of plenty, he would have to introduce severe budgetary cuts, and I'll bet that his party's popularity would soon be no better than that of Gyurcsány's. He might have to take away the extra money pensioners currently receive, he most likely would have to cut back on child support except in cases of extreme need, and he would have to expand the number of people paying income tax, reaching down to a previously untaxed bracket. What would happen then? As it is, trade unions are planning to demonstrate to oppose any constraints although Gyurcsány up to now hasn't dared to take drastic but most likely necessary steps. Local elections will take place in October and, if Fidesz introduced its own, more draconian austerity program--the one that Orbán outlined in a talk to a gathering of young political scientists and subsequently drowned in a flood of empty rhetoric, the country's cities and towns that are now practically completely orange might be red again. Surely, that is not a good prospect from the point of view of Fidesz. The best scenario for Orbán would be for Gyurcsány to stay and for his government to do all the dirty work. Then a year later when the current government's popularity is even lower than it is right now (hard to imagine but anything is possible) he will arrive as the Messiah.

So if Bokros is out of the question, who else could fill Gyurcsány's shoes? Names are circulating everywhere, but I can't quite imagine that any one of them would receive the votes of the majority of parliament. One of the names I heard mentioned is György Surányi, twice president of the Hungarian National Bank--first in 1990-1991 and again between 1995 and 2001. Viktor Orbán could hardly wait until Surányi's term came to an end, and for three solid years he did everything in his power to make the bank president's life miserable. Therefore I can't see Fidesz voting for him, but a more or less solid bloc of MSZP-SZDSZ-MDF votes would be enough. Besides Surányi, other economists were mentioned. For example, László Békesi's name came up. He is abrasive, lacking in political skills, and unpredictable. I don't think that he would be a good choice even if the three parties could agree on him, which I doubt. At a minimum, MSZP and SZDSZ would have to support a common candidate.  So there is a lot of talk about the resurrection of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition. I wouldn't discount a three-party coalition either. That, in my opinion, would be the best solution if the socialist-liberal-moderate conservative parties want to stem the tide of right-wing populism. That, of course, assumes that Gyurcsány's offer is genuine and that the parties could rally around another candidate.

The "political scientists" are in a tizzy. Suddenly, they don't know what to make of the situation. Nézőpont Intézet (Prospective Institute), a think-tank close to Fidesz, thinks that Gyurcsány's announcement of his intention to resign is nothing but a ploy. He wants to strengthen his position within the party and to show to the world that he is the only possible candidate for the premiership. Others feel that Gyurcsány simply wants to prove that it is not his person that is the obstacle to cooperation. My own position is close to that of Kornélia Magyar of the Progressive Institute who said to The Wall Street Journal today: "The socialists are probably not going to be able to find a new prime minister." It is possible that the party will propose a caretaker government of experts before the 2010 elections, but "I give a bigger chance that Gyurcsány is going to come back." In any case, not only did Gyurcsány receive a standing ovation from those present, but he also got 85% of the votes to remain the leader of his party.

Storm in a teapot?

It looks very much like it. On the op-ed page of Népszabadság (March 17) an opinion piece appeared with the title "Should Gyurcsány stay?  ... Or go?" The title is misleading because from the very first sentences it was clear that the two authors--Béla Galló, a "political scientist," and Péter Gábor, an "economist"--had already made up their minds: Gyurcsány must go! Under normal circumstances the appearance of such an article wouldn't have caused such a stir. But considering that this weekend MSZP is holding its congress to decide on the next party leader it was taken as a possibly important signal. Moreover, it appeared in Népszabadság, a paper close to MSZP. In fact, György Bolgár was so surprised and, let me add, puzzled that Népszabadság was willing to publish a piece so antagonistic to the current head of the party that he phoned the editor-in-chief of the paper. The editor assured Bolgár that the paper is not taking sides or supporting the party's left wing by giving space to their views. In fact, he said, the paper will publish articles espousing different points of views in the near future. Two days went by but there was no follow-up article. Today at last, József Debreczeni answered in no uncertain terms, comparing the tone of the article to that of pieces appearing in the right-wing papers. Another rebuttal appeared in Népszava from Máté Gyömöre, a young political scientist working for the Progressive Institute of Kornélia Magyar. He spent most of his piece listing the accomplishments of the Gyurcsány government, contradicting the Galló-Gábor duo's assertion that Gyurcsány in four or five years had accomplished nothing.

I'm quite familiar with Béla Galló because he is one of three permanent members of a weekly political discussion group led by Tamás Mészáros called Dominó (ATV, on Thursday nights). It's an hour-long program split equally between foreign policy and domestic affairs. I especially enjoy Zoltán Sz. Bíró's comments on Russia and the Balkans. He is a fountain of knowledge on Russia and Russia's foreign policy. To counterbalance Galló, the left-wing socialist, there is Krisztián Szabados (Political Capital) who claims to be a "conservative liberal" but who is, in my opinion, mostly conservative and a great admirer of the former Bush administration.

Béla Galló is the editor-in-chief of a monthly publication called Egyenlítő (Equator). Since I knew nothing about this publication save its name, I had to do a little research. Egyenlítő (http://www.egyenlito.eu/)  was started in April 2003. Its expenses are covered by a foundation of the Politikatudományi Intézet that used to be the Párttörténeti Intézet, that is, the research institute that studied the history of the Hungarian Communist Party as well as other topics related to the working class movement, as it was called in those days. The institute published a quarterly called Párttörténelmi Közlemények that at one point couldn't be purchased abroad. Not even by libraries. God only knows why not. After all, it was a historical publication though a bit on the biased side. The publication still exists today under a new name Múltunk (Our Past), and it still deals with topics related to the social democratic movement and its history. At one point the very existence of the Politikatudományi Intézet was in doubt because the Orbán government was not willing to spend money on an institute that, they argued, served only socialist interests. I don't quite remember what happened, but the insitute must have received some money and survived. It also seems that after 2002, with the reapperance of a socialist government, the Politikatudományi Intézet's coffers must have received some additional money because the institute's activities multiplied. It by now has a publishing venture (Napvilág Kiadó = Daylight Publishing Company), it finances Galló's Egyenlítő, and has a web site Múlt-kor. It has a research staff of over twenty historians and political scientists.

The name of the co-author of the op-ed piece, Péter Gábor, was completely unknown to me, and my research didn't bear a lot of fruit. I learned that he was or perhaps still is the CEO of an originally state-owned company later privatized called Medicor, a manufacturer of medical equipment. Medicor's history is briefly recounted in the May 17, 2004, issue of Élet és Irodalom (http://www.es.hu/index.php?view=doc;7508). The story is exceedingly complicated. Details that I couldn't always follow indicate that not all was cricket with this company. In any event, with the advent of the socialist government in 2002 Péter Gábor was named one of the members of the Országos Személyügyi Kollégium organized under the Prime Minister's Office. It seems that this group was entrusted with personnel selections for positions in government, was in charge of the education of civil servants, and looked over the background of people appointed to European Union positions.

But let's return to the article itself in which the authors vent their hatred of the prime minister. Perhaps their attitude has something to do with personal dislike, but their problem most likely is that they, as committed left-wing socialists, cannot reconcile themselves to Gyurcsány's liberalism. The article accuses Gyurcsány of personal ambition; most important to him is his personal survival while his party is dying because of him. A familiar accusation repeated daily by Fidesz politicians. According to Galló-Gábor he is a mediocre thinker and a totally untalented politician who in five years didn't manage to learn the art of governing. "Gyurcsány must leave in order for MSZP to stay," they claim. The problem is that these two men cannot come up with anyone in MSZP with a sound program and/or the ability to lead the party or form a government. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that either of the people whose names are circulating in left socialist circles as a possible replacement, Péter Kiss or Imre Szekeres, would stand a chance against Viktor Orbán.

Right now Fidesz is leading in public opinion polls by a mile and the odds of MSZP pulling off a miracle are slim. However, with a new, less charismatic leader at the head of the party, failure would be virtually guaranteed.